Questioning Lincoln: Who freed the slaves?

 

By: Mark Rothert

 

During recent decades a major area of academic research within Civil War historiography has revolved around the question of who freed the slaves. These arguments have come a long way and veered in a different direction from what many of us learned in high school. Lincoln’s role in emancipation, as well as his racial beliefs has come into question. Did Lincoln free the slaves and if not him then who? That is the question we have for Lincoln.

 

Two Schools of Thought

 

Over the last forty years historians have taken a renewed interest in the role African Americans played in the American Civil War, and in particular their own emancipation. Much of the historiographic focus has been on the question of who emancipated the African American slaves. The arguments fall into two basic camps. First there are those who believe saving the Union was the primary Northern war aim. From an international perspective white immigrants were flooding into the United States looking for freedom and economic opportunity. David Herbert Donald expands the theory of economic freedom in Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era, saying immigrants believed any man could become rich or even president. During the second half of the nineteenth century people equated the United States with freedom and that was worth fighting and dying for. Gary Gallagher in his recent work The Union War stresses the power of Union by adding that throughout the world it meant different things to different people. The United States represented the right of any person, rich or poor to determine his or her own definition of freedom. To African Americans it represented freedom from bondage.

George M. Fredrickson’s Big Enough to be Inconsistent: Abraham Lincoln Confronts Slavery and Race describes President Lincoln as a man who evolved through his presidency and realized the importance of what the United States truly represented to mankind. Once Lincoln understood the true essence of a free united people, he was able to unleash the Unions combined strength on the Confederacy.[1]
In the second camp are those who argue emancipation began taking place long before the war. They contend slavery was crumbling. Slaves were already finding their way to freedom, and the actions of Lincoln; whom many consider more racist than emancipator, only slowed the process down. Mary Frances Berry in her monograph Military Necessity and Civil Rights Policy: Black Citizenship and the Constitution, argues that Congress gave President Lincoln the power to enlist African Americans into the Armed Services as early as 1862. She contends his refusal to put that power to immediate use was a reflection of his own racial prejudices. According to Berry, Lincoln and Congress knew from the beginning of the war; ending slavery was the true aim of the war and African Americans were destined to win their own freedom.

 

Author Michael Les Benedict supports Berry’s argument in his essay A Constitutional Crisis, clearly stating that the slaves freed themselves. Writing in the companion volume to Ken Burns Public Broadcasting Documentary The Civil War, Barbara J. Fields adds that as soon as Lincoln was elected in 1860 the slaves decided to claim their freedom.
What Did Happened After Lincoln’s Election

In his first inaugural address Abraham Lincoln clearly stated it was his constitutional duty to preserve the Union and he had no intention of interfering with the institution of slavery.[2] With the opening guns of the American Civil War, both the Union and the Confederacy expected it to be short. Manpower did not seem to be an issue for either side. Citizens of the North and South volunteered to fight for their countries in what at the time appeared to be overwhelming numbers. But as the smoke cleared from the First Battle of Bull Run the two governments realized it would not be a quick victory for either side.

The problem facing both governments was how to recruit, equip, and house such large numbers of men. President Lincoln assigned the task of organizing the armies to Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase.[3] On May 4, 1861 Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas issued General Orders No. 15 and 16 establishing a system allowing field officers of the Volunteers to “be appointed by the Governor of the State furnishing the regiment.”[4] An Act approved by Congress on July 22, 1861,[5] endorsed Chase’s monumental decision and had a far-reaching impact on manpower issues throughout the war.[6] In May of 1861, Frederick Douglass wrote an editorial voicing his view on how to end the war.[7] He believed all the slaves should be declared free and an army of free African Americans and slaves be formed to march into the South. But the Northern States had been meeting their army enlistment quotas in what seemed to be overwhelming numbers and it was Lincoln’s opinion the public was not ready to accept African Americans as soldiers.[8] Ronald R. Krebs examines the elements of “claim-making” and “framing” in his work, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship. In order to put forth a valid argument in the political arena the people you are trying to influence must have a legitimate reason for considering your position. Without that reason they will feel safe in ignoring it and the argument will fail. In 1861 and the first half of 1862 there was no compelling reason for whites to consider arming African Americans.[9] Although Lincoln is well known for his political acumen, he needed to be acutely aware of popular public opinion and win the approval of the public.[10] This trait often leads modern historians to question his racial beliefs and actions.

Early in August 1861 Lincoln called for an additional five hundred thousand troops. Secretary of War Simon Cameron followed up the call with letters to the State Governors advising them of the urgency surrounding this need.[11] The Federal Government had hoped to use some of the new recruits to replenish the ranks of veteran regiments. However, using new recruits to replace loses in battle tested regiments reduced the number of officer appointments a governor could make. The Governors preferred retaining control. What had been a good Federal plan for expediting replacement troops to the front fell by the wayside in favor of State Executive’s political patronage and resulted in higher casualty rates.[12]

The 1860 U.S. census reported the total slave population in the South numbering over four million.[13] In November of 1861 the Montgomery Advertiser explained the Confederate slave strategy. They called the institution of slavery their “Tower of Strength,” intending to use slave labor to build fortifications, perform fatigue duty, provide logistical support, and maintaining their economy as well. Using this method, the South believed they could easily fill their military ranks with ten percent of their white population, totaling at least six hundred thousand men and more if needed. They believed they were the only nation who could do this without damaging its economy.[14] Contrary to the Montgomery Advertiser, modern historian Ira Berlin contends white people, North and South, did not see any need to involve slaves in the Civil War.[15]

In his monograph Big Enough to Be Inconsistent, George M. Fredrickson provides an overview of the many different schools of thought modern historians have developed regarding Lincoln’s racial attitudes. They run the gambit from egalitarian to white supremacist. Lincoln’s critics define him as less than hagiographic. These arguments are based on the actions and statements Lincoln made dating back to his early days in Illinois politics. Fredrickson suggests that much of the hagiographic writing was written in the 1960’s while Martin Luther King Jr. was pushing the civil rights movement forward and honoring the role Lincoln had played in the struggle for African American freedom.[16] Modern debate regarding Lincoln’s racial beliefs refer back to the late 1840’s. Lincoln’s home state of Illinois had some of the strictest anti-black laws in all of the Union. In 1848 the Illinois legislature sent a new State Constitution to the voters that contained a Negro exclusion clause. The exclusion piece was voted on separately and statewide received approval by over seventy percent of the voters. The “yes” vote in Lincoln’s home county was close to ninety percent. In 1853 Illinois again passed laws to keep African Americans out of the State, they included fines, and jail sentences if violated.[17] In Lincoln’s historic debates with Stephen A. Douglas during the 1858 Senate race, Lincoln argued against allowing slavery in the territories, Douglas favored “popular sovereignty,” labeling him as pro-slavery. The same debates are used to paint Lincoln as either a closet egalitarian or a hard-core racist.[18]
Fredrickson calls Illinois the most “negrophobic” of all the Northern states.[19] By being from a state that banned African Americans, arguing to prohibit the spread of blacks into the territories, even through slavery, and his eventual commitment to colonization is defined by some to be a form of ethnic cleansing.[20] His critics’ use these to support their argument that Lincoln was a white separatist. Fredrickson cites historians Lerone Bennett Jr. and Michael Linn as supporting modern thought that Lincoln was a racist and as the title of Bennett’s monograph implies he was Forced into Glory.[21] Shortly after he took office President Lincoln had rejected Douglass’ emancipation idea. When consideration is given to Lincoln’s Illinois background, and his quick rejection of Douglass’ call for emancipation, it is plausible to argue Lincoln himself needed as much convincing as did the nation regarding the slave question.

President Lincoln claimed, “My policy is to have no policy.”[22] This enabled Lincoln to react to fluid political situations. With no hard lines drawn he could respond to events, mold his position, and build a consensus. This was very much the approach he used when the issues regarding African Americans arose. As soon as Union troops moved into Confederate States, fugitive slaves began finding their way inside the Union lines.[23] Since no official policy existed, many Union officers dealt with the problem by returning the runaways to their masters. Late in May 1861, Union General Benjamin F. Butler, then in command of Fortress Monroe, realized returning the slaves under his jurisdiction was the same as providing labor to the Confederate war effort, so he took a more novel approach. He declared them contraband of war and subject to seizure. He reasoned that in time of war, property used in the war effort could legally be considered contraband, and if the South considered slaves to be property, they were then subject to seizure.[24] Use of this term offended Abolitionists and the Christian Recorder; they argued “contraband” refers to property and now it is being applied to men, women, and children.[25] Although the use of the term held questionable legal status and was found offensive by several parties, it was not questioned by the Lincoln administration. It solved a problem and pushed open the door to addressing the manpower issues facing the Union armies. On August 6, 1861 Congress followed Butler’s lead and passed the First Confiscation Act allowing the confiscation of “…any property of whatsoever kind or description…” The act went on to allow that use of the confiscated property “…shall be wholly for the benefit of the United States…”[26]

On August 30, 1861 Union Major General John C. Frémont, commanding the Department of the West, proclaimed martial law and declared the slaves of persons that had taken up arms against the U.S. to be freemen. Lincoln sent a direct presidential order dated September 11, 1861, instructing Fremont to conform to the First Confiscation Act.[27] Secretary of War Simon Cameron congratulated General Fremont and openly supported his ideas of emancipation and arming African American slaves.[28] In early January 1862 Lincoln asked for Cameron’s resignation and appointed him Minister to Russia, and the position of Secretary of War passed to the capable hands of Edward M. Stanton.[29] Lincoln was operating by his own sense of what was happening and letting events drive his decisions.

That same year Frederick Douglass again called for the emancipation of all slaves and the recruitment and arming of all African Americans, saying, “…that the American flag is the flag of freedom to all who rally under it…”[30]

When Lincoln delivered his annual Message to Congress on December 3, 1861, he stated he favored colonization and suggested that Congress consider colonization as a solution to the slave issue.[31] He also laid out a proposal for gradual compensated emancipation over a thirty-seven year period to be completed by the year Nineteen Hundred. The cost of compensated emancipation was cheaper than the cost of the current war. He claimed it would end the war, bring peace, and save money.[32] Lincoln critics contend all of these proposals weaken the argument of Lincoln being the “great emancipator.”

Early in March 1862, Lincoln proposed to Congress that they adopt a Joint Resolution allowing the U.S. to co-operate with any State adopting gradual abolishment of slavery by providing funds to compensate slaveholders.[33]

Later that month Union General David Hunter took command of a small theater of operation grandly titled the Department of the South consisting mainly of the Sea Islands and a few outposts in Florida. He declared marshal law and decreed all slaves in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina forever free.[34] Lincoln responded quickly by issuing a proclamation declaring the U.S. Government had no knowledge of such a decree, no commander or person was authorized to declare slaves free in any State, and Hunter’s proclamation was void.[35] Once again President Lincoln had passed up an opportunity to arm African American slaves.

On July 17, 1862, Congress passed two major acts, the Second Confiscation Act and The Militia Act of 1862. The Second Confiscation Act was much more far-reaching than the first. The Second Act not only allowed the U.S. to put refugee slaves to work, it also granted them freedom, but not citizenship. It applied to all slaves working for a master who supported the rebellion, even if the master lived in a loyal State. Any slaves of persons in rebellion who came into the Union lines were considered to be free.[36] The Militia Act of 1862 amended the Militia Act of 1795.[37] Militia was required to be “able-bodied male citizens,” this excluded African Americans. The act did allow the President to accept into labor or military service persons of African decent and not only did it grant freedom to the refugee slave; it also freed his mother, his wife and children. These two acts gave the President authority to confiscate all of the slaves, even those of loyal citizens if they were found guilty of in any way supporting the rebellion. The passage of these Acts gave Lincoln the tools he needed to bring African Americans into the military. As Frederick Douglass had argued in May 1861 “We lack nothing but your consent.”[38]

Lincoln was very clear in his first inaugural address and again in his “Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation” the war was being fought to restore the Union. Ira Berlin and other modern historians argue that these were only so many words and the administration and Congress knew the real war aim was freedom for the slaves.[39] Historian Mary F. Berry cites the Militia Act of 1862 as proof Congress realized whites could not maintain the war effort alone. Claiming the lack of a race clause in the militia section of the act demonstrated the intent of Congress to make it a war to free the slaves and give them citizenship.[40] The Confiscation Act passed on the same day gives freedom to slaves, but not citizenship. The Militia Act contains very specific language “…the enrollment of the militia shall in all cases include all able-bodied male citizens…” Disregarding the formal statements made by the President and Congress regarding official policies, Ira Berlin argues the slaves understood their futures depended on the outcome of the war and acted resolutely to place their freedom on the wartime agenda.[41] There is little doubt that the destruction of slavery was results of the war, but the ultimate aim of the war continued to be restoration of the Union.

Ira Berlin cites the 1860 census showing a quarter million free blacks living in the south claiming this as proof the slaves were freeing themselves well before Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation.[42] Masters were making concessions to slaves regarding their personal freedoms and these were deteriorating the foundations of slavery. He does however preface this by saying slaveholders rarely hesitated to use force to achieve their goals.[43]

In his recent work The Long Emancipation Berlin states that from 1830 to 1860 somewhere between 1000 and 5000 slaves per year found their own way to freedom. He refers to this as leakage and cites it as further proof slavery was crumbling. Berlin does note that even with leakage slavery continued to grow stronger during the same time period. [44]

According to Fredrickson, Lincoln critics support their argument by questioning his admitted preference for colonization, his efforts to achieve gradual compensated emancipation, and his failure to free the slaves using the powers given to him by the Second Confiscation Act and Militia Act of 1862. When Lincoln delivered his December 1862 address to Congress he could arguably be seen as having little direction and being a model of contradiction.

Modern historians continue to debate where Lincoln belongs on a graph between Great Emancipator and white supremacist. First, consider the possibility Lincoln did not occupy only one position on the spectrum, but instead he moved along it as he evolved as a leader. Early in the war he argued the nation was not ready to accept African Americans as soldiers, the truth may lie closer to the fact Lincoln himself was not ready to accept them. In his closing analysis Fredrickson comments that had Lincoln lived, his views about African Americans would have continued to evolve. The question is in what direction?

Second, we must keep in mind his decisions were made in context of the time. Viewing the past under the microscope of modern values distorts a historian’s judgment and interpretation of events. Historian Mark E. Neely, Jr. describes Lincoln as being a literal-minded person.[45] He was not one to hide his thoughts and during the first twenty months of his Presidency he made those thoughts clear. On more than one occasion he insisted he had a constitutional obligation to restore the Union. Freeing the slaves had not been on his agenda and he appears to have shared many of the same racial prejudices as the majority of white Northerners.[46]

Some modern Civil War historians spend a great deal of time applying labels, assigning credit or blame for events, and overlook the cause and effect relationship of events. Late in 1861 Lincoln began making calls for large numbers of troops and the States began having difficulties filling their quotas. Heavy Union battle losses made the prospect of being a soldier less appealing to potential white recruits. This also created a motivation for listening to arguments regarding African American enlistments. Broadsides from the period are a good indication of the problems recruiters faced raising troops as early as 1861. The primary motivation for white volunteers became the $302 bounty an individual was paid for enlisting.[47] Lincoln’s attitude toward raising African American troops began to change.[48] He was impressed with the impact confiscating Southern slaves had on the war effort. Thousands of slaves were coming into the Union lines and providing labor to the North and depriving the South of the same manpower resource. But the slave question ran deeper than just enlisting the services of African Americans. The first part of the question was how to make the best use of the freed African American slaves? The second part was what to do with four million freed slaves when the war ended.
Lincoln was aware that as long as slavery continued to exist, the Union would remain in a constant state of unrest. By mid-July 1862 he knew that a restored Union was going to be different from the Union that existed prior to the war. Slavery could not continue to exist in the restored United States. But the two Confiscation Acts and the Militia Act were not Lincoln’s policies. If he allowed African Americans to fight for the country, military tradition dating back to antiquity dictated they were entitled to certain rights. The reality was; if Lincoln armed the freed slaves and allowed them to fight he could never send them back into bondage.[49] Events had led him to the necessity of recruiting and arming freed slaves.

By mid1862 circumstances had reached a point were Lincoln must make a decision on the manpower and slave issues. “He” had drafted the Emancipation Proclamation, not Congress, not the slaves, and most importantly it was policy Lincoln had formulated himself. Events finally led him to define a policy. President Lincoln presented his cabinet with a draft of the Emancipation Proclamation on July 22,1862.[50] That same day he issued a Memorandum on Recruiting Negroes.[51] On August 25, 1862 Secretary of War Stanton authorized General Rufus Saxton to raise up to five thousand African American troops, making them an official part of the U.S. Army.

Two days after issuing the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln issued a “Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus” allowing for the arrest and trial subject to martial law “…all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments…affording aid and comfort to Rebels…”[52] Lincoln had voiced his concern over his constitutional authority to involve himself with the institution of slavery and one wonders if to his legal mind, suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus absolved him from that restriction.

As refugee slaves poured into Union army camps the problem of what to do with the freedmen prompted several ideas for colonization.[53] Central America, Haiti, and several Caribbean locations were mentioned as possible sites for relocation. Oddly enough Lincoln had met with Black leaders at a White House meeting on August 14, 1862 and explained it would be better for both races to be separated saying had it not been for slavery there would be no war.[54] He stressed the hopelessness of equality in the U.S. and suggested the economic benefits of African Americans colonizing Chiriqui, Panama. But two major obstacles stood in the way.[55] The relocation expense would be tremendous and the African Americans did not want to go.[56] When Secretary Chase read about the meeting he noted in his diary, “How much better would be a manly protest against prejudice against color! – and a wise effort to give freemen homes in America!”[57]

Up until the last of 1862, Lincoln left the South the opportunity to reconsider their position. Lincoln was about to etch in stone the Emancipation Proclamation. It would forever end the Southern planter’s use of bondage labor. The one caveat was the North had to win the war. Lincoln was evolving and this moved him closer to being emancipator.
Responses to the proclamation

 

A New York Times editorial said, “…it will make, we believe, very quick work of the rebellion.”[58] The Union Slave States planned to protest against the Proclamation and ask the president to revoke it or at the very least postpone it. They argued it would cause division among the Northern States. The New York Times claimed it would weaken the South and if it destroyed slavery, so be it. If it did not have the projected result the administration could abandon it and try something else.[59]

 

Raising African American troops appeared to be a simple solution to Union manpower shortages. Frederick Douglass had been championing the enlistment of African Americans since the beginning of the war. Following the official issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation Douglass wrote an editorial “Men of Color, to Arms.” He encouraged African Americans to rally to the colors and fight for the Union, “…I have implored the imperiled nation to unchain against her foes, her powerful black hand.” “This is our golden opportunity.”[60] The Christian Recorder took a more cautionary view, before asking their African American readers to volunteer they advised, “…they should also know whether they are to have all the rights and privileges of other citizens in every state in the Union, and receive the same compensation.”[61] Recruiting Broadsides posted to encourage African American enlistment had a different tone than those directed at white Americans. “Freedom, Protection, Pay and a call to Military Duty” were the headlines.[62] For all of the encouragement from Northern African American leaders and abolitionists, the number of recruits enlisted by March of 1863 was disappointing. In the seven months following the orders sent to General Saxton only five African American regiments had been mustered.[63] If emancipation truly did start in the fields and on plantations and the slaves had decided with Lincoln’s election that their time had come, why after seven month were there only five African American regiments mustered into Union armies and two of those came from Massachusetts?
Five days after the effective date of the Emancipation Proclamation, Confederate President Jefferson Davis issued an official response. Effective on the twenty-second of February 1863 all free blacks in the Confederacy returned to slave status. Any Negroes captured in the progress of arms, no matter the location, shall occupy slave status.[64] Davis made it clear that slavery was the proper condition of those of African decent and no reunion could take place without the acceptance of slavery nationally. Not only did the African American soldier face death and capture at the hands of the Rebels, but Davis also proclaimed any and all African Americans inside the Confederate boarders “were deemed to be chattels, they and their issue forever.”[65]

Impressed with the impact African Americans were having on the Union war effort Lincoln wrote that if they were taken away the war would be lost in three weeks.[66] When told by a citizen from his home state he would not fight for African Americans, Lincoln responded, “Some of them seem willing to fight for you…”[67] Lincoln concluded that African Americans were the tipping point of Union victory. Not only did they provide support and added strength on the battlefield, they also undermined the infrastructure of the Southern socioeconomic base.
An Act passed in 1813 already allowed for free African Americans to enlist in the Navy.[68] By wars end it is estimated twenty-nine thousand five hundred African Americans served in the U.S. Navy.[69] It is estimated that approximately one hundred fifty to one hundred eighty thousand African Americans enlisted into the Union Armies. Another estimated three hundred thousand labored for the Federal cause.[70] Overall fifteen to twenty percent of the Southern slave population found their way into the Union lines and freedom. According to the Confederate “Tower of Strength” model, no nation could absorb such a heavy blow to its workforce.[71] Between the loss of manpower and the naval blockade of its ports the Confederate economy teetered on the brink of collapse. Production of cash crops in the South dropped dramatically from 1861 to 1865.[72] Confederate money had become almost worthless, inflation reached nine thousand percent, food was in short supply, and there was a serious danger of malnutrition.[73]

 

What Were the Union War Aims – Was it freeing the slaves?

Lincoln’s references to the Declaration of Independence in his Gettysburg Address, is often used as proof that freeing the slaves had become his primary war aim. His use of the terms “new nation”, “the proposition that all men are created equal,” and “a new birth of freedom” are cited as clear proof his primary war aim was freeing the slaves.

In his recent monograph The Union War, Gary Gallagher rebuts that “freedom” meant freeing the slaves. He contends fighting for the Union was fighting for the promise of freedom, liberty, and opportunity, not only for African Americans, but also immigrants, the working class, and women.[74] Lincoln detractors follow a narrower interpretation unceasingly pleading the Gettysburg Address is evidence that freedom for the slaves had become the primary war aim.

Analyzing the Gettysburg Address and reaching the conclusion that Lincoln was speaking only of freedom for African American slaves is giving him too little credit. President Lincoln did not speak just of Americans. He understood the United States represented hope to the world. Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness are things all men are created equal to pursue and achieve. A government deriving its powers from the consent of the governed, testing whether that nation can long endure and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth is essential to Lincoln’s thought. In the opening paragraph of the “Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation” he again reiterated, “…the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States…”[75] His Gettysburg Address is a confirmation of the importance Lincoln placed on restoring the Union and the freedom it represented to the world.

In March of 1863 two more important Acts passed Congress, both having a dramatic effect on the recruitment and role of the freed slaves in the U.S. military. After taking numerous steps to bring African Americans into the war, Congress surprisingly passed the volatile Draft or Conscription Act of 1863 on March third of that year. The act began with a preamble again reiterating the aim of the war to be “…the maintenance of the Constitution and Union…”[76] Unfortunately the act only applied to “able-bodied citizens of the United States” and those who had declared their intention to become citizens, this could be read to say, “white males.”[77] Democrats supported the Draft act in the hope of undermining the Republicans in the upcoming1864 election.[78]
Lincoln believed in unanimity of action when seeking a common end and that common end was Union.[79] Secretary of War Stanton ordered Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas to head to the Mississippi River Valley and examine the military condition.[80] He was sent south for the express purpose of raising troops from the refugee slaves of the south. By the end of 1863 Thomas had raised twenty regiments and over fifty by the end of 1864. At the end of the war Thomas accounted for seventy-six thousand African American troops.[81]
General Thomas’ success as a recruiter was directly tied to Grant’s success on the battlefield. Frederick Douglass knew that if the North did not win the war, emancipation would be lost. The argument of who freed the slaves and was Lincoln the great emancipator does not take place if the Confederacy had won the war. I contend it was the African American troops and labor that provided the additional weight the Union needed to turn the tide of war and it was the Union Army of color that made emancipation possible.
Northern fortunes on the battlefield improved in the latter half of 1863, resulting in an upswing in African American recruiting. As freed slave enlistments increased, white soldiers began to appreciate the willingness and ability of the freed slaves to fight. In his February 1, 1863 after action report Colonel T.W. Higginson of the Union First South Carolina Infantry addressed the question of why African Americans would take up the fight.

 

No officer in this regiment now doubts that the key to the successful prosecution of this war lies in the unlimited employment of black troops…Instead of leaving their homes and families to fight they are fighting for their homes and families, and they show the resolution and the sagacity which a personal purpose gives.[82]

 

African Americans biggest benefit to the fight for the Union took place away from the front lines.

Freed African Americans slaves continued by working the captured plantations growing cotton, foodstuffs, performing construction, and logistical tasks providing support and offsetting the cost of the Union war effort. Most importantly they deprived the Confederates of their labor.[83] It is estimated five hundred thousand to seven hundred thousand slaves of all ages found their way into the Union Army lines during the course of the war. Referring back to the number of able-bodied slaves eighteen to forty-five years of age, the States with the highest percentage of African American enlistments were the States occupied by Union armies.[84] About forty-one percent of the total number of African Americans who served in the Union military was recruited from the Mississippi River Valley.

The loss of slaves slowly undermined the infrastructure of the Confederacy.[85] Contrary to the argument that slaves freed themselves the numbers say emancipation followed the Union armies.

Bell Irvin Wiley added that after their performance at Fort Wagner, Milliken’s Bend, and other engagements, attitudes changed toward the African Americans.[86] White troops came to the conclusion that if one result of the war was going to be the destruction of slavery, then the freed slaves should do their part, and they were just as capable as a white man of stopping Rebel bullets.[87] By the second half of 1864 the makeup of the Union Army had changed. No longer was it an army of white men. It had become an army of color. At Petersburg one of every eight Union regiments was African American. Walking the ground after the Battle of Franklin a Union officer commented, “…the blood of the white and black man has flowed freely together for the great cause which is to give freedom, unity, manhood and peace to all men.”[88] But the support of the freedmen did not guarantee the outcome of the war or their freedom.

The Presidential election was looming in November, the Northern people were war weary, and the experiment of emancipation was going to be tested at the polls. If Lincoln lost the 1864 election, Democratic nominee George B. McClellan’s promise of peace included the perpetuation of slavery. A Republican broadside for the 1864 election proclaimed Nation, Union, Government, and Country; there was no mention of freeing the slaves.[89] McClellan was not an abolitionist and promised peace with separation.[90] Lincoln was for Union, but he had tied himself to the doctrine of emancipation. He had set the policy himself and there was no going back, not for the Confederates, the Nation, or himself. For the man whose policy was to have no policy; his emancipation proclamation defined him in the 1864 election.[91] Lincoln’s successful re-election is testimony to the Nation’s acceptance of Lincoln’s goal to restore the Union using emancipation to achieve that goal.

Recent Historiography

Somehow, the discussion of who freed the slaves has become a focal point of recent American Civil War historiography. The question has become so fundamental William Friedheim and Ronald Jackson have recently written the critically acclaimed high school textbook Freedom’s Unfinished Revolution: An Inquiry into the Civil War. The authors unabashedly state that after the emancipation proclamation was issued “the aims of the war had been changed and that the Union was on a new course.”[92] Modern debate has become so polarized on who freed the slaves; it overshadows the importance of the unified victorious efforts of the newly blended Union Armies.[93] The more pressing issue should be what motivated African Americans and whites to join together in the mutually beneficial cause of restoring the Union.
Attitudes were changing and the positive role African Americans soldier played in winning the war became more evident with every Federal victory.

The Lincoln administration never lost focus of restoring the Union. The end of slavery was a result of the final victory, but Lincoln’s ultimate goal had always been restoration of a peaceful Union. To argue the Emancipation Proclamation was another example of Lincoln’s racist tendencies is to apply modern standards to the nineteenth century world. Lincoln issuing the Emancipation Proclamation in 1862 is tantamount to President Obama coming out in support of gay marriage or worse yet gun control. These were all bold actions that came at a time when the vocal majority of the population may not have agreed with the decision, yet like Obama, Lincoln, was re-elected.
For African Americans saving the Union meant freedom from bondage, the hope of citizenship, and being a representative part of the United States.[94] It was also the freedom to be whatever they wanted, to build a new life, make a fortune, or even become president.[95]
Frederick Douglass had encouraged African Americans to fight for the Union and their own freedom it, “was a war of ideas, a battle of principles…a war between the old and new, slavery and freedom, barbarism and civilization.”[96] He thought the nation would remember what African Americans had done, he was wrong.
Following the war he struggled to preserve their accomplishments.[97] The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution passed in January of 1865 and was ratified by the States that December legally making all slaves free. The Fourteenth Amendment gave them citizenship when ratified on July 9, 1868. Douglass saw Civil Rights Acts passed in 1866, 1870, ‘71, and ‘75.[98] However, the Civil Rights Case 109 U.S. 3 decided on October 16, 1883, found portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional and so much of what Douglass had worked for was lost.[99]
It is said the nation has a short memory and is constantly reinventing itself.[100] The “Lost Cause” authors instilled in the nation a joyous feeling of reunion and shared experiences of heroic efforts. For generations the “Lost Cause” mystique has been evident in Civil War historiography and it continues today. The role African Americans played in the Union victory became ”Black Invisibility.” Slowly, in small increments, historians rediscovered the contributions made by African Americans until the 1970’s when the historiography turned toward emancipation and slavery as the new focal point of social Civil War scholarship. Again obscuring the role African Americans played in the Northern victory.
In his recent work “The Long Emancipation” Ira Berlin echoes author Ta-Neshisi Coates saying, “Undoing slavery required every bit as much brutality as the making of slavery…Violence was inherent in the process.” The cost of freeing the slaves is measured in human lives. Whites and Blacks tenuously struggled together as soldiers and laborers to save the Union, but before the races could come together, Lincoln had to believe emancipation was the right way to proceed and then give his endorsement at the exact time white America was ready to accept it.[101]

The facts are the Union was saved, the slaves were freed, the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments were passed, and it happened at the sacrifice of thousands of African American and white lives. Winning the war could not have occurred without the participation of both races fighting together. The function of orchestrating this unification rested with the wisdom of Abraham Lincoln. The question facing historians going forward should be what are the lessons we can learn from this historic undertaking?

Regardless of whether Lincoln was a racist, or great emancipator, he found the means to achieve his constitutional duty of saving the Union. When at last given the chance, African American soldiers and laborers became the tipping point for the Union victory. White troops of the Union held the Confederates in check for the first two and a half years of the war until Lincoln called upon the African Americans to build a Union Army of color. Freeing the slaves was a combined effort, Lincoln and Congress provided the tools and thefreed African American slaves provided the extra muscle needed for the Union Army to deliver the powerful hammer blows for Union and freedom.

 

 

 

 

[1] W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America1860-1880, First Free Press Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 5,55,57,125, David Herbert Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered: Essays on the Civil War Era, Vintage Books Edition, (New York, A Division of Random House, Inc., 2001), 51, Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2011), 76, 79, 88, 92, 117-8, 146, George M. Frederickson, Big Enough to be Inconsistent: Abraham Lincoln Confronts Slavery and Race, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008), 124, 126, also see David W. Blight, “For Something beyond the Battlefield,’ Frederick Douglass and the Struggle for the Memory of the Civil War,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Mar., 1989), viewed on line 11/27/12, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1908634, 1161,1164-1165, 1176, Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865, (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1987) 1, 94, 131, 231, Joseph T. Glatthaar, “Black Glory: The African-American Role in Union Victory, In Why the Confederacy Lost, edited by Gabor S. Boritt, 133-162, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), 138, 142, 149, James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997), 98, 112, 119, The Negro’s Civil War: How American Negro’s Felt and Acted During the War for the Union, (New York, Pantheon Books, A Division of Random House, 1965), 205, 213, Mark E. Neely, Jr., “Lincoln and the Theory of Self-Emancipation,” in The Continuing Civil War: Essays in Honor of The Civil War Round Table of Chicago, edited by John Y. Simon, Barbara Hughett, 45-59, (Dayton, Morningside, 1992), 54, 56, 58.

[2] First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln, Monday, March 4,1861, New Haven, Avalon Project, Yale Law School, 2008, viewed on line 12/07/12, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp, 1.

[3] Armin Rappaport, “The Replacement System During the Civil War,” Military Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer, 1951): 95-106, viewed on line 11/24/12, http://www.jstor.org/stable1983404, 95-96.

[4] OR, Series III, Vol. 1, 151-157.

[5] Statutes, Vol. XII, 268-271.

[6] Ibid, 95.

[7] Frederick Douglass, “How to End the War,” Douglass’ Monthly, May, 1861, (Rochester, University of Rochester Frederick Douglass Project), viewed on line 12/07/12, http://wwwlib.rochester.edu/index.cfm?PAGE=4373, 1

[8] Frederick Douglass, “Our Work Is Not Done,” speech delivered at the annual meeting of the American Anti-Slavery Society held at Philadelphia, December 3-4, 1863, (Rochester, University of Rochester Frederick Douglass Project), viewed on line 12/07/12, http://wwwlib.rochester.edu/index.cfm?PAGE=4403, 5.

[9] Ronald R. Krebs, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship, (New York, Cornell University Press, 2006).

[10] Ibid, 57, also see Fredrickson, Big Enough, 40.

[11] Ibid, 412-415.

[12] Rappaport, The Replacement, 105.

[13] Berlin, Freedom’s Soldiers, 16-17.

[14] Montgomery Advertiser, (November 6, 1861), Quoted in James M. McPherson, The Negro’s Civil War: How American Negro’s Felt and Acted During the War for the Union, New York, Pantheon Books, A Division of Random House, 1965, 39.

[15] Ira Berlin, Barbara J. Fields, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and The Civil War, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4.

[16] Fredrickson, Big Enough, 9-10, 18.

[17] Fredrickson, Big Enough, 38-39.

[18] Fredrickson, Big Enough, 41.

[19] Fredrickson, Big Enough, 35.

[20] Ibid, 21.

[21] Ibid, 22-25.

[22] David Herbert Donald, Lincoln, (New York, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1995), 15.

[23] Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865, (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1987), 24.

[24] Kate Masur, “A Rare Phenomenon of Philological Vegetation”: The Word ‘Contraband’ and the Meanings of Emancipation in the United States,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 93, No. 4 (March 2007): 1050-1084, viewed on line 11/14/12, http://ps2kv4py4r.search.serialssolutions.com.library.norwich.edu/?genre=article&issn=00218723&title=Journal+of+American+History&volume=93&issue=4&date=20070301&atitle=%22A+Rare+Phenomenon+of+Philological+Vegetation%22%3a+The+Word+%22Contraband%22+and+the+Meanings+of+Emancipation+in+the+United+States.&spage=1050&pages=1050-1084&sid=EBSCO:America%3a+History+and+Life+with+Full+Text&aulast=Masur%2c+Kate, 1050.

[25] Masur, A Rare Phenomenon, 1066.

[26] Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of the United States of America from December 5, 1859, to March 3, 1863, Vol. XII, (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1866), viewed on line 12/11/12, constitution.org/uslaw/sal/sal.htm, 319.

[27] Cornish, The Sable Arm, 13.

[28] Ibid, 21.

[29] CW, Vol. IV, 169, 174, Vol. V, 96-97.

[30] Ibid, 27.

[31] CW, Vol. V, 48.

[32] Ibid, 518-537.

[33] CW, Vol. V, 144-146. On April 10 just such a joint resolution was passed.

[34] Cornish, Sable Arm, 34-35.

[35] OR, Series III, Vol. II, 42-43.

[36] Statutes at Large, Vol. 12, 589-592.

[37] Ibid, 597-600.

[38] Douglass, How to End the War, 2.

[39] Ira Berlin, Barbara J. Fields, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and The Civil War, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4.

[40] Mary Frances Berry, Military Necessity and Civil Rights Policy: Black Citizenship and the Constitution, 1861-1868, (Port Washington, National University Publications Kennikat Press, 1977), 42.

[41] Berlin, Slave, 4.

[42] Berlin, Slaves, 7.

[43] Ibid,10.

[44] Berlin, Slaves, 5-6.

[45] Mark E. Neely, Jr., “Lincoln and the Theory of Self-Emancipation,” in The Continuing Civil War: Essays in Honor of The Civil War Round Table of Chicago, edited by John Y. Simon, Barbara Hughett, 45-59, (Dayton, Morningside, 1992), 54.

[46] Fredrickson, Big Enough, 22.

[47] Broadside Entitled, “Wanted 500 Able Bodied Men,” 1861, National Archives, Archival Research Catalog, Selected Documents from the War Department, Digital Copies, ARC Identifier 4644610, MLR Number P117 519, viewed on line 12/15/12, www.archives.gov/research/arc/topics/civilwar.

[48] W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America1860-1880, First Free Press Edition, New York: The Free Press, 1998), 125.

[49] Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 82.

[50] CW, Vol. V, 336-337.

[51] CW, Vol. V, 338.

[52] Ibid, Vol. V, 436-437.

[53] James M. McPherson, The Negro’s, 77.

[54] Ibid, 370-375.

[55] Ibid, 428

[56] Ibid, 431.

[57] Chase, Inside, 112.

[58] Editorial, “A Month of the Proclamation,” The New York Times, Oct. 22, 1862, viewed on line 11/15/12, http://accessible.com.library.norwich.edu/accessible/search.

[59] Editorial, “The Border States and the President,” The New York Times, Dec. 20, 1862, viewed on line 11/15/12,   http://accessible.com.library.norwich.edu/accessible/search.

[60] Frederick Douglass, “Men of Color, To Arms!,” Broadside, Rochester, March 21, 1863, Rochester, University of Rochester Frederick Douglass Project, viewed on line http://wwwlib.rochester.edu/index.cfm?PAGE=43732, 1-2.

[61] Editorial, “The Call for Colored Soldiers. Will They Fight? Should They Fight?,” The Christian Recorder, February 14 1862, viewed on line 11/15/12, http://accessible.com.library.norwich.edu/accessible/search.

[62] Circular Entitled, “To Colored Men! Freedom, Protection, Pay, and a Call to Military Duty!,” 1863, National Archives, Archival Research Catalog, Selected Documents from the War Department, Digital Copies, ARC Identifier 1497351, MLR Number P117 360, viewed on line 12/15/12, www.archives.gov/research/arc/topics/civilwar.

[63] Cornish, The Sable Arm, 113.

[64] Jefferson Davis, An Address to the People of the Free States: by the President of the Southern Confederacy, Richmond, January 5, 1863, viewed on line 02/19/13, http://galenet.galegroup.com.library.norwich.edu/servlet/CivilWar?dd=0&locID=vol_n82n&d1=SABCA03270700&srchtp=b&c=3&d2=1&docNum=O3803198803&b0=%2522Davis%2C+Jefferson%2522&h2=1&b1=SU&d6=1&ste=10&dc=tiPG&stp=DateAscend&d4=0.33&n=20&d5=d6, 1.

[65] Ibid.

[66] CW, Vol. VII, 507.

[67] Ibid, 509.

[68] Herbert Aptheker, “The Negro in the Union Navy,” The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April, 1947): 169-200, viewed on line 11/28/12, http://www.jstor.org/stable2714852, 173-174.

[69] Ibid, 179.

[70] Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, 80.

[71] McPherson,The Negro’s, 39.

[72] James L. Roark, “Behind the Lines: Confederate Economy and Society,” in Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand, edited by James M. McPherson, William J. Cooper, Jr., 201-227, (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 206-207, sugar production dropped from 264,000 tons to 9,950 tons, cotton fell from five million bales to 250,000 bales.

[73] Reid Mitchell, “The Perseverence of the Soldiers,” In Why the Confederacy Lost, edited by Gabor S. Boritt, 109-132, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), 127.

[74] Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2011), 34-35

[75] CW, Vol. V, 433-434.

[76] Statutes at Large, Vol. XII, 731.

[77] James Geary, “Civil War Conscription in the North: A Historiographical Review,” Civil War History, Vol. 32, No. 3, (Sept. 1986), 208- 228, viewed on line http://web.ebscohost.com.library.norwich.edu/ehost/delivery?sib=b4, 208.

[78] Geary, Civil War Conscription, 211.

[79] Gallagher, The Union, 33.

[80] OR, Series III, Vol. III, 100-101.

[81] Cornish, Sable Arm, 114.

[82] OR, Series I, Vol. XIV, 198.

[83] Ibid, 138.

[84] Berlin, Freedom’s Soldiers, 17, Mississippi 21%, Louisiana 31%, Arkansas 24%, and Tennessee 39%. Georgia 4%, North Carolina 8%, South Carolina 8%, Virginia 6%, and Alabama 6%.

[85] Glatthaar, Black Glory, 135.

[86] The bravery of African American troops at Fort Wagner was immortalized in the movie Glory. Unfortunately in the traditional Hollywood fashion of John Wayne watching the sun set along the western ocean shore of Vietnam in The Green Beret, the brave men of the 54^th Massachusetts in the movie Glory try attacking Fort Wagner from the North rather than the previously unsuccessful charge made from the south in 1863.

[87] Cornish, Sable Arm, 229-230. Cornish quotes an Irish song sung at an Irish Brigade banquet in January 1864 titled “Sambo’s Right to be Kilt” that demonstrates the attitude toward African Americans.

[88] Glatthaar, Black Glory, 159.

[89] Gallagher, Union War, 6.

[90] Ibid, 90-91.

[91] New York Times, Border States, Dec. 20, 1862 4.

[92] Ibid, 79.

[93] Mary Frances Berry, Military Necessity and Civil Rights Policy: Black Citizenship and the Constitution, 1861-1868, (Port Washington, National University Publications Kennikat Press, 1977), ix, 30,35,41,46,75,92, Michael Les Benedict, “A Constitutional Crisis,” in Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand, edited by James M. McPherson, William J. Cooper, Jr., 154-173, (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 172, Ira Berlin, ed., Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, assoc. ed., Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation 1861 – 1867, 4 volumes, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), Berlin, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, eds., Freedom’s Soldiers: The Black Military Experience in the Civil War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 18, 21-22, 24, 36, 46, Berlin, Barbara J. Fields, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and The Civil War, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3-5, 74-75, Barbara J. Fields, “Who Freed the Slaves,” In The Civil War, edited by Geoffrey C. Ward, 178-181. (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1990), 181, William Friedheim, William, Ronald Jackson, Freedom’s Unfinished Revolution: An Inquiry into The Civil War and Reconstruction, (New York, The New Press, 1996), viii, 65, 80-81, also see Frederickson, Big Enough, 20-22.

[94] McPherson, Negro’s War, 213.

[95] Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered, 50.

[96] Blight, For Something, 1163.

[97] Blight, For Something, 1160

[98] Statutes at Large, Vol. XIV, 27, Vol. XVI, 140, Vol. XVII, 13, Vol. XVIII, 335.

[99] Legal Information Institute, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, Robinson and wife vs. the Memphis & Charleston R.R. Company, Cornell University Law School, http:/www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historic/USSC_CR_0109_0003_ZO.html.

[100] Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered, 55-56

[101] CW, Vol. VI, 406, Fredrickson, Big Enough, 125.