Opening the Champagne: African American Combat Regiments Fighting as Part of the French Fourth Army in Phase One of the Fall 1918,
Franco-American Offensive.

 

by

Mark Rothert

 

 

September 25, 1918 was a relatively quiet day along the Western Front lines. Suddenly, at 11:30 PM, the firing of the Allied artillery’s heavy guns broke the calm. The hills along the horizon glowed from muzzle blasts piercing the darkness.[1] Exploding shells rained iron on the German lines and signal rockets directing the artillery added pulsating illumination to the scene.[2] The Allied Commander-in-Chief, French Marshal Ferdinand Foch’s long awaited offensive had begun.

 

Foch and French General Henri-Philippe Pétain began planning this great offensive on June 14, 1918. Foch wanted the offensive to encompass the entire Western Front. He intended to push the Germans out of France by the end of the year. He believed if he could accomplish this, the Allies would be in a position to end the war in the spring of 1919. Ironically June 14^th was the same day German General Erich Von Ludendorff announced that the German Army would launch an offensive in July of the same year.[3]

 

Ludendorff’s plan for the offensive was simple, find a weak spot in the Allied line, attack it in force, break through, and cause so much attrition the Allies would be forced to sue for peace. At the very least, he hoped to turn the tide of the war back in favor of the Germans. He decided to attack the French in the same area where the first Battle of the Marne had been fought in September of 1914. The German offensive opened along a forty-kilometer front on July 15, between 0415 and 0530 hours.[4] Unfortunately for Ludendorff, his army ran into a French army now practicing Pétain’s new defensive doctrine. Following the new doctrine, the first line of French trenches, rather than being a main line of resistance, acted to slow the enemy and alert the second defensive infantry line and artillery of the attack.[5] Pétain’s defensive strategy surmised that as an opening move, German artillery would concentrate their preparatory barrage on the first defensive line. An infantry assault would then follow the barrage. After weathering the enemy barrage, the French front line would set off signals alerting their artillery the enemy infantry attack had begun. The French artillery would then concentrate their fire on the enemy troops occupying the now abandoned French front line. The French guns would devastate the German infantry attack and at the same time remain out of German artillery range. Captain Fish of K Company, U.S. 369^th Regiment served with the French in one of these front lines. He did not expect to survive the ordeal. It was their job to set off gas and signal rockets before trying to make it back to the second line of defense.[6] Pétain’s new defensive strategy worked as planned. The French artillery took a terrible toll on Ludendorff’s attacking infantry.[7] The German offensive was blunted in two days. Then an Allied counter offensive pushed the Germans back to their original jump off points. Casualties on both sides were staggering. The Germans lost 168,000, the French 95,000, the British 13,000, and the U.S. 12,000 men.[8] The question became, how could either side make good these losses.

 

The Germans and the French had reached the limit of their reserve manpower resources. Ludendorff had to reduce the size of his divisions and rely heavily on machine guns and artillery to cover his long defensive lines.[9] Fortunately for the Germans, they had been building and strengthening their defensive positions since early in the war. In places, there were four separate lines and miles deep, making them extremely formidable.[10] Ludendorff considered the French to be equally short of manpower. Therefore, he assumed the Allies could only mount a limited offensive.[11] This would allow the Germans to shift units along the line and reinforce threatened areas.[12] Ludendorff had not fully appreciated the impact of arriving U.S. troops.

 

Marshal Foch expected the daily arrival of thousands of American soldiers to make his devastated divisions whole again. Amalgamation, as they called it, was the blending of American troops as replacements into existing French units. General John Pershing, with the support of President Woodrow Wilson, advocated for an independent U.S. Army.[13] Pershing used the planning stages of Foch’s offensive as a means of reaching that end. He satisfied the French demand for amalgamation by offering them the African American 93d Division. The French, already knowing what fierce fighters their African 2d Moroccan Division were; welcomed the 93d with open arms.[14] This resolved Pershing’s dilemma of what to do with his African American troops and the issue of amalgamation. He also convinced Foch to give him command of his own army.[15] Foch now had the manpower he needed to launch an offensive along the entire Western Front. In theory, reducing the German’s ability to transfer troops from one hot spot to another.

 

Foch announced his plan on September 2, 1918. It included five parts.[16] First was the St. Mihiel offensive, which the Americans completed prior to September 26^th.[17] Second, the American First Army was to attack in the area between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest. Third, at the same time the Americans attacked, the French Fourth Army was to attack west of the Argonne Forest toward the Aisne River while maintaining liaison with the Americans on their right. Fourth, the French Fifth Army was to capture the Rheims forts and exploit the advances of the French Fourth Army.[18] Fifth, on the 27^th, the British Army, positioned on the French left, were to advance between Oise and Scarpe Rivers and continue on toward Cambrai-St-Quentin.[19] The French and the Americans planned to take the formidable Argonne Forest by flanking it from both sides, join forces at Grandpré, and ultimately capture the Carignan/Sedan/Mézières railroad and break the Germans lateral line of supply.[20] By capturing the rail line, the German position would be rendered untenable and force them to retreat into Belgium. The rail objective lay 53 kilometers north of the Allies front line.[21]

 

Pershing’s First Army was to occupy the front-line near Verdun, an area the French considered sacred ground.[22] Upon the completion of the St. Mihiel Operation, Pershing faced the daunting task of moving 600,000 men and material from St Mihiel to the Meuse-Argonne line and replace the 220,000 French men currently holding that part of the line. Rearranging 820,000 men right under the noses of the German Fifth Army, without them knowing, tested the skill of the American Staff.[23] The troops traveled on railroads, in trucks, and marched at night along inadequate, heavily camouflaged roads. Pershing made the switch undetected and was ready to attack on September 26^th.[24] German General von Gallwitz reported the American withdrawal from St. Mihiel on September 21 claiming the Americans were granting their battle-test troops a rest and an attack was not imminent.[25] Pershing had torn a page out of Ludendorff’s book and achieved the element of surprise.[26]

 

The U.S. 93d Infantry Division, provisional (the division had no artillery), consisted of four African American infantry regiments, the 369^th, 370^th, 371^st, and the 372d.[27] Early in September 1918, three of these African American regiments were assigned to the French Fourth Army under General Henri Gouraud. The 371^st and 372d became part of the famous French 157^th “Red Hand” Division, so named for their valiant and bloody defense at Verdun.[28] The 369^th had already earned their nickname “Hell Fighters” fighting with the French 16^th Division during the German’s July offensive.[29] September 9 they were transferred to the French 161^st Division.[30] That same day the 370^th became part of the French 59^th Division, Tenth Army.[31] Now, as part of the French army, they were outfitted in blue French uniforms and helmets and armed with French weapons. They were quickly moved toward the front line.

 

The African Americans began their move on September 13, first by train, then trucks, and finally marching three nights and sleeping during the day. The weather was bad and they received one meal a day.[32] On the morning of September 25 they arrived at Han, France near the Champagne region.

 

In the opening phase of the battle, the French 157th was to be held in close reserve, ready to exploit any successes or breakthroughs created by the initial Fourth Army advance.[33] The three battalions of the 369^th were assigned as the support reserve of the 161^st Division, behind the French 163d and 363d Infantry Regiments.[34] To their left was the fierce 2d Moroccan Division.[35] Together the 2d Moroccan and French 161^st Divisions were to be the rupture units, with the 157^th acting as the exploitation division.[36] The 368^th, from the U.S. 92d Division, were the only U.S. African American troops with a role in the initial Franco-American attack. They had been assigned to Groupement Durand on the extreme right of the French Fourth Army. Their assigned task was to maintain liaison with the U.S. First Army’s 77^th Division on the U.S. extreme left that extended to the western edge of the Argonne Forest.[37] Maintaining liaison is a difficult and manpower intensive responsibility even for experienced troops.

 

In anticipation of an attack in the Champagne region, three additional German divisions had been moved into the line of the Third Army.[38] During the night of the 25th most Allied soldiers were contemplating the determined German resistance they expected, many became quiet and to themselves.[39] Bruce Wright, a private in the U.S. 372d, and some of his mates took a different approach, they settled into a game of cards. When their Captain came by, he chided them for playing cards on the eve of battle. According to the Captain they should be on their knees. Heeding the captain’s advice they put away the cards, dropped to their knees, and started shooting dice.[40]

 

A total of 3,980 Allied guns stood armed and ready with well over 28,000 gas shells of various types and 400,000 HE shells.[41] A map had been prepared for both the French and Americans showing the concentration of artillery fire and areas to be saturated with High Explosive (HE) or gas. Allied corps commanders had the final say on the use of gas and most felt the wind unfavorable during the opening barrage.[42] At 11:30 PM, on September 25, with all of the Allied pieces in place, the preparatory artillery barrage began.[43] French guns rained high explosives on German roads and communications.[44] Signal rockets directed the artillery fire as the men manning the guns cursed and demanded more ammunition.[45] At 1:50 AM the German Group of Armies von Gallwitz reported by telephone that almost the entire front was under heavy artillery fire.[46] U.S. artillery joined in at 2:30 AM.[47] German artillery countered with heavy doses of gas. The Franco-American Armies would suffer heavy losses due to gas in the days ahead. German losses from gas would represent only about twelve percent of their total casualties, far less than the Allies.[48]

 

At 5:25 AM September 26, 1918, whistles blew all along the Allied line, signaling thousands of French and U.S. troops to climb out of their trenches and advance toward the enemy. Pershing’s First Army, with its oversized divisions, lurched forward expecting its shear weight to roll over the surprised Germans of the Fifth Army.[49] Meeting light opposition, the U.S First Army advanced eight miles the first day.[50]

 

Sunrise on the 26^th came at 6:42 AM and for the first time in days the weather was suitable for flying.[51] The sky over the battlefield came alive with Allied aircraft of all kinds. Low flying reconnaissance planes spotted front lines, troop movements, and directed artillery fire. Bombers flew beyond the front lines making raids on German railroads. German air activity was light at first, but picked up considerably as their pursuit planes attacked balloons, reconnaissance aircraft, and troops on the ground.[52]

 

On the far right, Groupement Durand, with the U.S. 368^th covering their extreme right, went over the top at 5:25 AM. The 2d Battalion led the way supported by a machine gun company and insufficient artillery fire.[53] The artillery did little damage to the German barbed wire. The 368^th had not received the promised heavy wire cutters needed to cut through the new, strong German wire. Unable to cut through the wire they were forced to use existing pathways making lateral liaison difficult.[54] With no true objectives other than maintaining liaison with the U.S. 77^th, the attack of the 368^th broke down into three uncoordinated pieces. One group pushed forward into the enemy trenches. The other two groups managed to penetrate the enemy lines and then fell back to a position a quarter mile behind where they had started.[55] The attack was resumed about 1:15 PM, but German rear guard machine gunners stunted the assault and added to the confusion. By 2:30 PM, liaison within the regiment P.C. had been lost as had contact with the U.S. 77^th on their right and the French units on their left. Later in the day patrols from the 77^th found elements of the disjointed 368^th.[56] The 368^th was ordered to resume the attack the next morning.

 

On the left of the Franco-American assault, the French Fourth Army took a more cautious approach. The French 161^st Division moved forward behind a rolling artillery barrage with the French 74^th Division to their right and the 2d Moroccan Division on their left.[57] They met little resistance and easily reached their first planned position. The Germans in the Champagne defenses had been ordered to put up a brief fight from their forward position and then fall back to the Main Line of Resistance.[58]

 

The French 161^st and 2d Moroccan Divisions pushed on toward the second enemy position and met heavy resistance. The fierce Moroccans charged with reckless abandon taking heavy losses from well-placed, accurate German machine gun nests, causing a gap to open between them and the161st. The 369^th, 3d Battalion saw the problem and not waiting for orders, moved to fill the gap.[59] They advanced in a scientific fashion. Using shell holes and deserted trenches for protection from enemy machine gun fire. They appeared to be twice their number by using a wave formation.[60] The ground was littered with dead and dying Germans. The 3d Battalion’s wounded piled up as well. There was cursing, praying, and heart rendering groans, but they fought on through the morning until they had forced the Germans out of the village of Ripont.[61] The 3d Battalion pushed through Ripont and established a front line three quarters of a kilometer north of the village.[62]

 

In their new position, north of Ripont, the 369^th’s 3^rd Battalion received orders to prepare to attack the slopes of the Bellevue Signal Station. Their objective was to take and hold the Tranchée de Bellevue. Following closely behind a rolling barrage, they made the attack at 3:30 and again at 5:00 PM. They encountered stiff resistance from deadly enemy artillery and machine guns. Unable to reach their objective, they formed a line for the night north of the La Dormoise Riviére.[63]

 

Colonel Herschel Tupes, of the 372d, received orders from the French 157^th Commander General to move north toward Ripont. They marched north with 3d Battalion in the lead followed by 1^st and 2d Battalions respectively. The 371^st followed suit.[64] The 371^st and 372d moved along camouflaged roads and through trenches littered with human debris, hoping not to be spotted and become targets for enemy aerial bombardment. Red Cross ambulances sped by them along the torn up roads, heading toward field hospitals with their precious cargo. The volume of traffic spoke to the carnage that was taking place at the front.[65]

 

Weather on the 27^th was cloudy with fair to poor visibility.[66] The U.S. First Army resumed their attacks in the Meuse-Argonne area encountering a more determined and stiffening opposition. They were taking heavy fire from artillery in the Argonne Forrest on their left and the heights east of the Meuse River on their right. They were able to make only slow, small advances.[67] Word also spread that the U.S. First Army had taken the formidable German position of Montfaucom. These reports proved to be premature.[68]

 

Like the U. S. First Army, the French Fourth Army found the going more difficult. They encountered determined German resistance, well entrenched behind heavily wired positions.[69] At 3:45 AM the U.S. 368^th received new orders from Groupement Durand. A group of 75mm guns had been placed at their disposal and they were instructed to attack at 5:15 AM across a two-battalion front with 2^nd Battalion on the right, 3^rd Battalion on the left and 1^st Battalion in reserve. As had happened the day before, confusion took charge. Several companies moved out unsupported. Company G advanced and made contact with the French 11^th Cuirassiers, but was stopped by enemy machine gun fire.[70] By afternoon companies E and H advanced to the next German trench line where they would spend the night without liaison on either flank. As companies G and F moved forward, they became separated, and were unable to make contact with any units to their left or right. Company G was withdrawn. During the morning, companies L and M continued moving forward. On the regimental left, 3^rd Battalion finally formed and attacked at 5:30 PM. About 7:00 PM the advance was halted. There was no liaison among the front line troops as they settled in for the night. Even with all of the confusion, some elements of the 368^th had moved into the town of Binarville.[71]

 

Along the French front in the Champagne area, the 369^th moved into the Ripont swamp north of the village. Orders for an attack were delayed by slow communications and the difficulty of translating them from French to English. The attack was launched sometime after 10:00 AM. The 369^th moved forward in column of battalions with 3^rd in the lead, followed by 2^nd, and then the 1^st. They advanced with the French 163^rd on their left and the 363^rd to their right. The Germans had been waiting for them to move into the open. From their defensive position the Germans could clearly see the 369^th. Having previously measured the range, German artillery and machine guns took a deadly toll on the 369^th. The 3rd and 2nd Battalions suffered dramatic casualties as they moved through the Ripont Swamp.[72] Fighting forward, the 369^th was able to gain a foothold on the side of Fontaine-en-Dormois.[73] The French units had begun to move forward on both sides of the 369^th, 2^nd Battalion. Machine gun fire from Bellevue Signal Ridge tore into 369th and forced their French officers to call for a retreat. About 5:20 PM orders came from the 161^st Division for the 369^th to resume the attack at 6:30 PM. The 74^th Division was to be on their right and the 157^th on the left. The attack was called off.[74] They fell back to Fontaine-en-Dormois where they held for the night. During the night, 2^nd Battalion replaced 3^rd as the lead battalion.[75] While the weary 369^th dug in for the night, there was a lull in the fighting. The Germans took advantage of the break in what had been uninterrupted fighting to strengthen their defensive position. The German Third Army reported the arrival of almost three full divisions to bolster their defenses.[76]

 

By 2:00 AM on the 27^th, the French 157^th “Red Hand” Division was holding in position and ready to move into the front line. At 12:30 PM the 371^st resumed their march in order of battalion, 1^st, followed by 3^rd and then 2^nd. At 4:00 PM the French 157^th was ordered to move the 371^st in the direction of Ripont. Lead elements reached Fontaine-en-Dormois after midnight on the 28^th. From their position astride the Ripont-Gratreuil road, the 371^st was prepared to take part in the battle.[77] Following orders from the French 157^th Division Commander General, the 372^nd Regiment, less 2^nd Battalion, who were held in reserve, had been the on march since early in the morning. They arrived at their assigned position a few kilometers north of Minaucourt in the Ravin d’Hebuterne around 2:30 AM on the 28th.[78]

 

The Germans were holding their line by primarily employing machine guns assisted by artillery dropping heavy doses of gas on the Allies. Ludendorff considered it a successful day.[79] The Crown Prince was not ready to fully commit to the Franco-American attacks in the Champagne and Meuse-Argonne sectors. Signs continued to point to a full-scale attack in the Lorraine. Intercepted radio transmissions supported his suspicion.[80] On the 27^th a combined British-French attack opened between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers northwest of Champaign. German high command was beginning to recognize the scale of the Allied offensive.[81]

 

On September 28, General John Pershing believed, “There is evidence that the enemy is retiring from our front. Our success must be followed up with the utmost energy, and pursuit continued to bring about confusions and demoralization, and to prevent the enemy from forming his shattered forces.”[82]

 

A group of 75-mm guns and two companies of the 351^st Machine-Gun Battalion, 92^nd Division were attached the 368^th. At 2:25 AM they were instructed to direct their attack toward Binarville. Liaison was to be maintained with the French 11^th Cuirassiers on their left and the French 10^th Dragoons would be in support. The 368^th’s, 1^st Battalion was held in reserve, with orders to be prepared to deal with counter attacks and establish liaison with the U.S. 77^th to their right.[83]

 

Orders written in French arrived at the 368^th command post at 3:30 AM. They needed to be translated before being distributed to the battalions. The orders were to attack in half an hour. An artillery barrage finally started at 4:30 with the infantry following close behind.[84] Companies moved independent of each other from trench line to trench line and back again.[85] When the sun rose at 6:45 it lit up a gray, rainy sky and did little to improve visibility.[86] Enemy machine gun fire from Bellevue Signal ridge made advancing difficult and liaison between units almost impossible. Two urgent messages were sent to 2^nd Battalion ordering them to resume the attack. Finally at 12:30 PM Companies E, F, and H with G in support, coordinated their efforts and attacked in echelon. They advanced about 500 meters before heavy German machine gun fire checked their advance and threw them into confusion. [87]

 

To the left, 3^rd Battalion had attacked with three companies at 7:30 AM and met light resistance. About 2:30 PM there was a dramatic increase in enemy fire that halted their advance. All three companies fell back behind a stream in Vallée Moreau, southeast of Binarville, where they reorganized.[88] At 3:30 PM word arrived from Groupement Durand ordering the 368^th to take the town of Binarville. By 5:30, the freshly reformed 3^rd Battalion launched another attack toward Binarville. They gained little ground and during the night 1st Battalion relieved them. Orders were sent to resume the attack at dawn the next day.[89]

 

General Lebouc, commander of the French 161^st Division, telephoned orders at 1:30 AM instructing the French 163^rd Regiment, the U.S. 369^th, and the Moroccan 2^nd Division to take Bellevue Signal ridge by a series of attacks moving from west to east. A preparatory artillery barrage was to be followed by the infantry at 7:00 AM, September 28th. [90] Prior to the attack being launched, the 369^th and the adjoining French units were hit by German counterattacks. These were successfully repulsed, but it would be afternoon before they could organize the offensive against Bellevue ridge.[91]

 

About 2:00 PM, the 369^th moved forward and worked their way to the southern slope of the ridge. Two hours later they held a tenuous line from Mont Cuvelet to Bellevue Signal ridge. With the French 163^rd Regiment on their right and the French 363^rd to their left, the 369^th received orders to resume the attack at 6:30 PM. The orders for the 369^th were rescinded and the French regiments attacked without them and captured part of the ridge. Division headquarters telephoned orders for the 369^th to pass between the French regiments and help complete the capture of Bellevue Signal Station. Once this was accomplished the regiments were to reform and move northeast toward the Les Rosier Farm. The orders further instructed the 369^th to take the lead and continue the attack and capture Séchault.[92]

 

Efforts to capture Bellevue Signal Station went on until the next morning and had been a costly process for the 369^th. The regimental field hospital handled over 300 wounded in a single day. Acting Regimental Adjutant Whittlesey reported to Colonel Arthur Little that 2^nd Battalion was “Shot to hell…trying to take Bellevue Signal.”[93]

 

September 28 marked the first full day of combat for the French 157^th “Red Hand” Division. General LeBouc ordered the division to take position on the left of the 161^st Division. He also advised, the right flank of the 157^th was to be held by an African-American regiment.[94] The 371^st Regiment moved into position and occupied a 500-meter front between the French 161^st and Moroccan 2^nd. The regiment was in column of battalions, Major Joseph Pate’s 1^st Battalion, 371^st Regiment took the lead, followed by the 3^rd and 2^nd battalions respectively. To their left was the 2^nd Moroccan Division. In unison they attacked at 6:45 AM as part of General LeBouc’s planned “succession of attacks.”[95] The 371^st pushed forward the advance, however, the French troops on their left fell back and the 161^st on the right was stalled by German counterattacks. This left the 1^st Battalion in a small salient protruding unprotected into the German line. They met powerful resistance at Cote 188 south of Bellevue Signal Station. By making a flanking movement to their left at the same time the 372^nd made a flanking movement to the right, Pate’s 1^st Battalion was able to take Cote 188.[96] Colonel Miles ordered Major Cope to move his 3^rd Battalion to Cote 188 and “hold ground at Cote 188 against any eventuality.”[97]

 

As originally ordered, the 1^st Battalion pushed on toward Bellevue Signal Station. The Germans were well-entrenched and poured devastating machine gun fire into the advancing troops. In an effort to maintain the attack, Major Pate requested artillery support. Colonel Miles responded by runner “It is very important that you send me immediately your new location and most of all the position gained by your advance line in order to be able to use artillery fire, It will be possible…to get you artillery aid.”[98] The combination of artillery and infantry was proving too much for the German defenders on Bellevue Signal ridge. The 371^st along with the 372^nd overran the western portion of the ridge and advanced to a position south of the Bussy Farm.[99] Here they reorganized in preparation for an assault on the farm. Major Pate sent reports saying the Germans had evacuated the farm. Orders came from the division command to take and hold the farm. Major Cope’s 3^rd Battalion was assigned the task. Moving on the left of 1^st Battalion, they fully occupied the Bussy farm by 7:00 AM the next morning. The remainder of the 371^st organized a line on the south slope of Signal Station ridge and dug in for the night with the 2^nd Moroccan on their left.[100]

 

Because of the way the divisional boundaries had been drawn, the French 157^th advanced north and the French 161^st moved northeast, creating a gap between the two. About 2:30 AM the 372^nd had reached a position north of Ripont[101] When orders were received to plug the gap on the right of the 371^st, Colonel Herschel Tupes, 372^nd’s Commanding officer, was very specific about the importance of maintaining liaison between battalions, regiments, and the regimental C.P. by any means possible. The exception was carrier pigeons. Those were reserved for communication between front line battalions and division. In addition, the division aviator requested the front lines to be marked by panels that could be seen from the air.[102] At 8:40 AM, with 3^rd Battalion in the lead and 1^st Battalion in support, the 372nd advanced to fill the 500-meter gap.[103] After taking position on the right of the 371^st they were ordered to attack at 9:30. Third battalion, of the 372^nd, received orders to open the attack in the direction of Mont Cuvelet and Bellevue Signal. When the signal rocket was fired the Allies deployed into assault waves of regiments abreast in columns of battalions. Advancing behind a rolling barrage, they pushed on toward Mont Cuvelet and the left of German held Bellevue Signal Ridge.[104] They made contact with the Germans on Signal Ridge at 11:30. Johnson’s 3^rd Battalion began taking heavy casualties from machine gun fire enfilading his line from the left. His battalion drifted too far to the left and was in the 371^st’s section of control. Colonel Tupes advised him to move 3^rd Battalion 400 meters right and continue the attack.[105] Once proper alignment with the 371^st was established the pace of the advance picked up.[106] The fight continued through the afternoon. The German position was well constructed and stubbornly defended. By late afternoon the combined weight of the two regiments finally pushed the enemy out of their position and the western slope of Bellevue Signal ridge was secured.[107] The combined strength of fresh troops and artillery fire diminished the German moral, forcing them to fall back.[108] Slowly the 372nd gained a foothold on the side of Bellevue Signal Ridge.[109]

 

Portions of the ridge were still under German control. An attack, to be made by infantry and artillery, was ordered for 6:30 PM, but not carried out.[110] Johnson reported, “Heavy casualties-Co K reports only 40 men left. Co I has not seen so many casualties. Several officers wounded: Co I has two officers left. Duylas & Sessons. Co L one Lt Deeker. Must have reinforcements to do anything further.” Colonel Tupes could see Johnson’s men resting on the hillside and they were still drawing enemy fire. The reflection from their canteens gave away their position. Tupes sent orders for Johnson to move his men and have them cover their canteens.[111] Johnson reorganized what men he had left and continued the advance toward the Bussy Farm.[112] With the 371^st still on their left, they reached the heights south of the farm by dark. As the 3^rd Battalion occupied the trenches south of the farm for the night, two of their companies continued on and became lost in the darkness. The two lost companies reached a road crossing west of Séchault where they spent the night separated and alone.[113]

 

The German Third Army had been under heavy attack all day. Claiming a “great defensive victory” they had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. The German air force shared in the victory. Flying in low clouds and rain they provided daylong reconnaissance and used the newly developed tactic of ground support for the infantry.[114] Ludendorff believed the day to be a success as well, “…we held our lines, apart from certain modifications of our front which we carried out in accordance with our plan.”[115] Yet that same evening he met with Field Marshall Hindenburg to discuss his views regarding making a peace offer and requesting an armistice. Hindenburg agreed the time had come.[116]

 

Weather on the 29^th continued to be rainy with poor visibility.[117] The U.S. Army had been pouring men and material into their Meuse-Argonne zone with limited success. By the 29^th they were bogged down by fierce enemy resistance, mud, and severe resupply problems. Colonel Ward of the Engineers reported that the, “Troops do not seem to be making an organized attack, or to be making an advance.”[118] It was also the day French Prime Minister George “The Tiger” Clemenceau decided to visit the U.S. front lines. He found the Americans “hopelessly swamped.” He placed the blame on the inexperience and incompetence of the American higher-level staff.[119]

 

Groupement Durand sent orders to the 368^th, 1^st Battalion at 12:55 AM, instructing them to move from their reserve position to the front line. They were to make contact with the French 9^th Cuirassiers assault battalion on their left and the U.S. 77^th Division to the right. The 2^nd and 3^rd Battalions were ordered to be withdrawn from the front line.[120] Daylight broke at 6:46 and Company F fell back from their advanced position. By 11:00 AM, 1^st Battalion began moving forward to relieve 2^nd Battalion. A combined force of 1^st Battalion and the French 9^th Cuirassiers did the same for 3^rd Battalion. What had been intended to be completed by daylight, took until 4:30 PM. Groupement Durand had hoped to attack toward Binarville in the afternoon. The advance was made at 6:00 PM by the French 9^th Cuirassiers. They managed to capture a portion of the German trench to their front. While the 368^th 1^st Battalion did not participate in the action, they did move forward to help hold the 9^th’s gains against a German counterattack. This advanced position was to act as the base for an assault on Binarville, now scheduled for noon on the 30^th.[121]

 

At 12:35 PM on the 29^th the American I Corps assigned the remainder of the 92^nd Division to the French XXXVIII Corps. The French announced the assignment at 5:00 PM and sent orders for them to move to a zone of assembly southwest of Vienne-le-Château below Biesme.[122] Now the entire 92^nd and 93^rd Divisions were “temporarily” part of the French Fourth Army.

 

Orders issued on the 28^th defined the mission of the French 161^st Division, which included the 369^th, to make a spirited attack north in the general direction of Vouziers on the 29^th. The orders called for the 161^st to prevent the Germans from reforming along their chosen line of resistance. Their objective was to take the town of Challerange and the heights behind it. Their left was protected by the 157^th who were to take Monthois and advance five kilometers beyond. To their right, the French 363^rd formed the rest of the attacking line.[123]

 

During the early morning of the 28^th, the 369^th played a role in completing the capture of Bellevue Signal Station. They had helped take the northeast portion of the ridge, and Mont Cuvelet. The rest of the morning was spent reorganizing their lines and preparing for the assault on Séchault. As part of the reorganization, 1^st Battalion passed through 2^nd Battalion, and 3^rd Battalion drew the honor of leading the attack.[124] Shortly after noon the battalions had completed their movements and were ready to open the attack on Séchault from the south. They received support on their left from the 372^nd, who had crossed divisional boundaries and attacked from the west earlier in the day. About 2:45 the 369^th descended from the high ground south of the town and moved into the open valley below the town.[125] The Germans put up a spirited resistance using well-directed artillery fire and machine gun fire. The companies of the 372^nd, who had lost their way the night before, were found by the 369^th and assigned duties. German aircraft added to the mayhem of the attack. Flying so low, the men on the ground could see the pilot’s face as he strafed the entire length of their line.[126] Later in the afternoon the German artillery bombardment of the town stopped. One company from 1st Battalion and the 2^nd Battalion of the 369^th entered the town and out flanked the German position. By 7:00 PM they reported Séchault clear. The 369^th dug in north of the town to defend against an expected counter attack. They held the line during the evening hours. No counter attack came and before daylight they fell back to the southern edge of town to allow for a preparatory artillery barrage the next morning.[127]

 

At 2:00 AM, the 157^th Division HQ issued orders for the division to advance on a three-regiment front in column of battalions. The line consisted of the 372^nd on the right, the 371^st in the middle, and the French 333^rd on the left. The 2^nd Moroccan Division, in line to the left of the 333^rd, was to attack in a northerly direction and overrun the enemy positions as they encountered them. The 157^th was assigned the dual task of protecting the Moroccan right flank and moving forward in an “advanced-guard” formation, locating enemy units in their own front and then bringing the weight of the regiment to bear on them.[128]

 

Orders to advance had not reached Major Cope of the 371^st 3^rd Battalion when the French 333^rd Regiment began their move forward at 10:00 AM. On his own initiative, Major Cope ordered his battalion to advance and maintain liaison with the 333^rd. Verbal orders would arrive later from the regimental intelligence office, Lieutenant Samusson, confirming Cope’s action. The column was arranged with 3^rd Battalion in the lead, 2^nd Battalion in support and 1^st Battalion in reserve. By moving forward without specific orders, the 371^st lost contact with the 372^nd on their right. Shortly after beginning the assault, the 333^rd was stopped by German machine gun fire. Company K of the 3^rd Battalion turned left and pitched into the machine gunners and routed the Germans from their position, allowing the 333rd to continue their advance. Company K then joined the 333^rd and fought with them until the end of the day. The rest of Cope’s men went on to capture the villages of Ardeuil and Montfauxelles. They pressed the attack and captured the important railroad yards and shops north of Montfauxelles. Liaison with the 372^nd on the right had been completely lost. In support of 3^rd Battalion, 2^nd Battalion moved into Montfauxelles and established a position with one company forming a right flank guard. South of them 1^st Battalion extended the right-flank along the Séchault-Ardeuil road. The only Allied troops the 371^st could see on their right were at least two kilometers away. They had also out run the French troops on their left. The regiment halted for the night in this exposed position.[129]

 

Without support on either flank, the 371^st had created a salient. Recognizing the 371^st’s exposed position, the Germans launched a violent counter-attack. High explosive and gas artillery shells rained down on the salient. German airplanes attacked the 371st from the sky while infantry and machine guns rushed their position. For seven hours they battled the German counter offensive. Much of the time they were forced to fight wearing gas masks. Without giving ground, the 371^st held their position. They took heavy casualties, but never waivered. If there had been any doubt about the courage and fortitude of the U.S. African-American troops, the 371^st answered it in blood.[130] At the end of the day the towns and rail yards were theirs.

 

From their position south of the Bussy Farm the 1^st and 3^rd Battalions of the 372^nd were preparing to launch an advance by dawn. It was their primary responsibility to protect the right flank of the French 157^th Division as they drove the enemy out of their defenses. Regimental HQ ordered 1^st Battalion to replace 3^rd in the order of assault. The latter was to provide support and maintain liaison on both flanks. At 10:00 AM, 1^st Battalion began its attack with 3^rd Battalion following at a distance of 500 meters. Their day’s objective was to reach the outskirts of Challerange. About an hour into the assault, the battalion began taking heavy machine gun fire from the direction of Séchault. It was 11:20 AM when the 1^st Battalion discovered the French 161^st, who should have been on their right, had not moved forward. With losses mounting, the 372^nd was forced to adjust the direction of their march and attack toward Séchault. Around 1:00 PM patrols from the 372^nd enter the town, but were driven back by heavy German machine gun fire.[131] Later that afternoon the 369^th joined in the attack. Both regiments suffered heavy casualties in the sustained, but successful fight for the town. When the 372^nd was finish helping with the final mop-up, they were withdrawn to a position south of the Bussy farm for reorganization. Both the 1^st and 3^rd Battalions had been badly mauled and suffered heavy losses in officers and men. The fighting strength of both was greatly diminished and replacements were not available. The only practical solution was to consolidate the two into one provisional battalion.[132]

 

By September 29^th Ludendorff was fully aware of the intention and extent of the Allied offensive. He believed the Allies were prepared to “recklessly” commit all the manpower and materiel they thought needed to end the war. German reports claimed the Americans were down to their last four battle-tested divisions and were bolstering their numbers by placing inexperienced divisions between the more experienced divisions. That morning Ludendorff met with Secretary von Hintze to discuss the possibility of making a peace proposal while the Allies were reeling from the losses they had suffered in the opening phase of their current offensive. The Germans felt they could still negotiate from a position of strength.[133]

 

Ludendorff’s defensive strategy of thinning his infantry ranks and making liberal use of artillery and machine guns appeared to be working. When the Allies paused, the Germans were able to reinforce threatened positions. They had brought ten new divisions to the front and staged numerous savage counter attacks. The German Third Army, 52^nd Division had counterattacked and broken through the enemy line. As they pressed through the breech they encountered powerful Allied reserve units who threw them back and closed the hole. Close to 5:00 PM a heavy attack was made against the left flank of the German Third Army. The German Fifth Army, on their left, was forced to commit their reserves to restore the line. During the night the First and Third Armies of the German Crown Prince, refused their left front turning it toward the east.[134] Both sides paid a heavy price during the first phase of the Allied offensive.

 

September was ending with the U.S. forces still stymied by increasingly heavy German artillery and machine gun fire. Severe U.S. losses could not be quickly replaced due to the lack of supplies and the means to transport them. The American First Army fought desperately to hold the ground they had already gained. They could do little more than stave off constant German counterattacks.[135]

 

The French Fourth Army made plans for continuing their advance on the 30^th of September. Challerange was to be their primary objective, followed by the important rail center and German supply base of Monthois. Both were strongly defended. The plan was to secure a partial encirclement of the town before making a direct assault. Once this was accomplished the artillery would begin with a powerful preparatory bombardment, followed by an infantry attack. The French 161^st Division received orders to take the wooded heights west of the city. On their left, the French 163^rd Division was to move through Les Petits Rosier to the slopes west of Challerange and maintain contact with the French 157^th on their left. The 369^th was to take the right flank of the 161^st and the French 363^rd Division further extended the line to the right. Artillery preparation was scheduled for dawn, about 6:48 AM, followed at 7:00 AM by the main infantry attack.[136]

 

September 30 dawned cloudy and rainy with poor visibility.[137] That morning Groupement Durand sent orders instructing the French 9^th Cuirassiers to attack toward Binarville at noon. The 1^st Battalion of the 368^th was ordered to hold their position and make a solid liaison with the U.S. 77^th on their right. These orders did not reach the 368^th until late in the evening.[138]

 

Around 8:00 AM, 1^st Battalion sent reconnaissance patrols forward toward the German trenches in their front. They found no enemy and at 11:00 AM, three companies moved into the abandoned trenches leaving one company behind in support. Liaison with the U.S. 77^th had also been re-established. In the afternoon the French 9^th Cuirassiers jumped off toward Binarville. Having no orders, but seeing the French attacking, Companies A, B, and C of the 368^th sprang from their new position joining the French in their attack.[139] By 4:00 PM two companies of the 368^th entered the town of Binarville. Enemy artillery continued to pound the town. The Allies took possession of the abandoned German works 300 meters south of Binarville. As the 1^st Battalion reorganized, they received word they had been returned to the control of their U.S. brigade. Orders would now be arriving directly from Headquarters of the U.S. 184^th Brigade, 92^nd Division. They resumed their advance and a gap opened between the 368^th and the 77^th. At 8:30 that night, the U.S. 367^th received orders from 184^th Headquarters to fill the gap. The French XXXVIII Corps overrode the order figuring the French could cover the gap. The 368^th was ordered to hold their position. Close to 10:00 PM new orders arrived for 1^st Battalion to withdraw.[140] That night the entire regiment was withdrawn from the front line and moved to a 184^th assembly area about 10 kilometers south of La Harazée. Responsibility for liaison with the U.S. 77^th passed to the French 9^th Cuirassiers.[141]

 

At 7:00 AM that morning, French General LeBouc, commander of the 161^st Division, ordered them to resume the attack to the northeast toward the Rosiers Farm. With 1^st Battalion leading the way and the 2^nd in close support, the 369^th started forward. With the French 163^rd on their left and the 363^rd on the right, the three regiments advanced abreast for about one kilometer. Enemy aircraft accurately directed the artillery fire, supported by machine gun fire they ripped into the advancing troops with deadly effect.[142] The 369^th lost ten officers and several hundred men. Captain Hamilton Fish had been on furlough when the 369^th made their assault on Séchault. As the commander of Company K, he cut short his visit to the staff school in Lanngres and made his way back to his company.[143] On his way back to the regiment, Fish managed to procure about a hundred loaves of bread. This was a welcome treat for the battle weary men who had been fighting non-stop with little or nothing to eat.[144] In Fish’s opinion the regiment had almost ceased to exist as an effective combat unit. Orders came via telephone from 161^st Division headquarters for the attack to be continued by the French 363^rd passing on the right of the 369^th. Later that night, the 369th was officially relieved by the 363^rd and ordered to move to a position near the Bellevue Signal Station. The battered 369^th then acted as reserves until they were withdrawn during the night of October 6-7.

 

Around 7:00 AM, General Mariano Goybet’s 157^th “Red Hand” Division resumed their advance with the 3^rd Battalion of the 371^st in the lead. Their objective was Monthois and its important rail yards. The 2^nd Battalion was in close support and the French 333^rd was protecting both flanks. Moving quickly, with few casualties, the 3^rd Battalion out ran its right flank support and 2^nd Battalion was deployed to protect the right from enemy fire.[145] By 9:30 AM they had advanced over a mile and captured the Triéres Farm. At 11:00 AM they established a line north of the farm where they encountered well-placed artillery and machine gun fire. The two battalions suffered heavy losses as they held this position. Colonel Perry L. Miles of the 371^st sent a blunt message by runner to General Goybet’s headquarters, “Our right is in the air. I have not been able to get any liaison on my left.” Receiving artillery support, the 371^st resumed the attack at 3:00 PM, but were unable to make any progress. They halted for the day in the position north of the farm. That night Colonel Greenough, commanding 2^nd Battalion, sent Miles a desperate message, “Our losses are enormous. We are in no condition to put up a defense. We must be relieved tonight. It is impossible to deliver food or water. The shelling is beyond belief.” During the night the 371st was replaced in line by the 372^nd and ordered to reorganize in an area near Audeuil. It took until about 5:00 AM to complete the change of position [146]

 

From the command post of the 372^nd, Colonel Tupes had been sending a steady barrage of messages to his battalion commanders demanding updates on manpower and losses. Responses varied, but overall, casualties in officers and men had been heavy. Besides needing more men and ammunition, the main requests were for food, water, and heavy wire cutters. A shopping list of items arrived from 2^nd Battalion, “we need: 1200 V.B. grenades, 1200 C.F. grenades, Bengal lights -150, 3 star rockets – 25, Red lights – 25, Green lights – 25, white lights 40, yellow smoke flares 25.”[147] They had been in the continued fighting along Bellevue ridge. Using a method of leap-frogging the man in front of them, the battalion was advancing about five yards at a time. Finally on the 30^th they took and held a position on the plateau, 250 meters south of the Bussy Farm. Tired, worn out, and with their ranks depleted, it was all they could do to hold their position against repeated counter attacks.[148]

 

Ludendorff and Hindenburg were convinced the fortunes of war were turning against them and met with the Kaiser on the 30^th to discuss their peace “at once” strategy. Admiral Paul von Hintze, the German Foreign Secretary, was in favor of approaching President Wilson with a proposal for an armistice and peace, using Wilson’s fourteen points as the basis for the discussion. It was imperative that the German Army showed no signs of weakness. For the plan to work, Ludendorff insisted, “…prove that you have the unbreakable will to fight.” Hindenburg agreed that a continued strong defensive, coupled with diplomacy would result in a favorable peace for Germany. Unfortunately there were serious problems with reinforcements; they were unable to cover the wastage on the front and enemy bombers were wrecking havoc on supply depots.[149] The decision was made to conduct a quiet, calculated, gradual retreat to the Hemann-Hunding-Brunhild (Hindenburg) line, saving all the supplies possible while inflicting as many casualties as they could.[150] The withdrawal was to be named the Gudrun Movement and would be executed, “…wherever a serious enemy attack is anticipated.” Orders were transmitted only under seal. Orders from the Group of Armies German Crown Prince demanded, “A constant vigilance will be exercised to insure that there will be no premature withdrawal of the front, which would only serve to cause the enemy to renew his attacks with greater force.”[151] As the retirement began, the Germans reinforced their lines in front of Gouraud and Pershing. The fierce German defense and counter-attacks against the French Fourth army would continue.[152]

 

October began with the American forces still stalled in the Meuse-Argonne area. There was a shortage of motor vehicles and animals. Washington sent word to replace animals with motor vehicles; the army had few of either. Men and officers were also at a premium and replacements were in short supply. Fifty thousand men were needed to replenish the depleted combat organizations. The Services of Supply (SOS) was stripped of men and trucks adding to the supply problem. Compounding the issue, while they tried to resupply and reinforce, the Germans used the respite to do the same.[153] To the left of the Americans, the French Fourth Army, XXXVIII Corps continued their slow advance against a marked increase in enemy gas shelling.[154]

 

At last, on October 1 the rain stopped. Although it continued to be cloudy with poor visibility, the let up in the rain was good for the many wounded and helped improve the moral of the men.[155] The 368^th began its withdrawal from the front lines about 4:00 AM. Companies B, C and D pulled out and moved to a reserve position. Close to 7:00 AM, Company A began to fall back from its position north of Binarville and rejoined the rest of the battalion. The 92^nd Division remained in reserve of the XXXVIII Corps until October 4 when it was returned to the American I Corps. The next day they were reassigned to American IV Corp and began moving to the vicinity of Nancy.[156]

 

At 5:00 AM, 2^nd Battalion, 372^nd relieved the 3^rd Battalion, 371^st from its front line position northwest of the Trières farm and the 371^st Regiment started its move to division reserve near the town of Ardeuil.[157] Colonel Miles sent a message to General Goybet informing him that during the 371^st‘s advance, “…3 avions were brought down by our machine gun and rifle fire. Each plane was seen on the ground and verified.” Then he turned his attention to finding food for his men. Miles sent Lieutenant Taylor with a fiery message for Captain Collins, “You have not sent the rolling kitchens forward as arranged with Lt Taylor. Your failure has caused our sorely used up troops to go without greatly needed food. You will turn over all kitchens to Lt Taylor, give him what information you have now of their location and whether or not they are supplied with food. Lt Taylor will henceforth have command of these kitchens.”[158] The 371^st remained in divisional reserve until the division was relieved on the night of October 6-7.

 

Shortly after midnight, the recently combined provisional battalion of the 372^nd moved forward and dug into a position three kilometers north of Séchault. Their 2^nd Battalion, who had relieved the 371^st, held the line at the Trières Farm, two miles south of Monthois. Flanked on both sides by the French 333^rd, Robison’s 2^nd Battalion was ordered to entrench itself and organize its position. Colonel Tupes located his Regimental P.C. 500 meters south of the Trières Farm, using the dugouts recently abandoned by the enemy.[159] Division issued orders at 7:00 AM advising Tupes to be ready to attack Monthois. The advance would begin when the 2^nd Moroccan Division was ready to join the attack. Just prior to the attack, the 120th Moroccan relieved the 2nd Moroccan. Now, with the 120^th on their left and the 161^st on their right, the 157^th jumped off toward Monthois.[160]

 

The Germans were determined to hold the city. During the preceding night they had beefed-up their defenses and they put up a stiff resistance. The 372^nd was attacking up hill over ground that was in bad condition. They received little support from the French artillery and the 120^th and 161^st quickly fell behind. Without support, the 372^nd and the entire 157^th Division came up short of taking their objective, Monthois.[161] Early in the afternoon Major Johnson of the 3rd Battalion sent Tupes an assessment of his available men, “The personnel of men & officers present yesterday can only be given approximately at this time. Bn HQ 3 officers about 15 men, Co I No officers about 9 men, Co K No officers no men, Co L 3 officers about 25 men, MG no. 3(,) 5 officers and 56 men”[162]

 

The Germans fought off strong probing patrols and could see heavy traffic behind the French Fourth Army lines. Balloons floated closer to the German lines indicating an imminent attack. The German Third Army reported local attacks against the hills north of Binarville. They repositioned troops to threatened points and immediately pushed forward newly arriving artillery units. Increases in artillery strength allowed for mutually supported fire and was carried out on a large scale. Using roving guns proved equally effective and General von der Marwitz recommended its future use against infantry. German counter attacks succeeded in saving their front line. The Allies were beaten back after fierce fighting. Third Army logged in its war diary, “The day closed with the complete success of our defense and very severe casualties for the enemy.”[163]

 

Orders for the next day again assigned 157^th the mission of taking Monthois and Challerange. The strategy was to do it in three phases. They were ordered to begin the attack after the 120^th Moroccans captured the heights of Croix des Soundans to the west and the heights to the northeast. These were the last of the enemy positions south of the Aisne River. Upon capturing these heights the 120th was to fire signal rockets, indicating completion of their mission. The rockets would also signal it was time for a rolling artillery barrage to begin. The 157^th would start its advance behind the barrage and the 161^st would attack at the same time on their right. The Moroccans were to begin their attack on the heights at 11:00 AM, October 2. [164]

 

On October 2^nd, the Allies correctly interpreted the enemy’s plan, “Oct. 2, Intelligence Report First Army, AEF-(e) Enemy Intentions: There is now positive evidence, based on readjustments of his communications that the enemy is organizing in depth on line approximating the Kriemhild-Stellung (Hindenburg Line).”[165]

 

Colonel Tupes issued field order No. 8, giving instructions for the 372^nd’s assault on Monthois for October 2. The hour of attack was to be set by the 120^th Moroccan Division firing a three-globe rocket from the Croix-des-Soudans after they had captured it. These heights were to the left of the 372nd. The front line battalions were to repeat the signal along down the line. A mobile barrage was to precede H-hour by five minutes. The attack would follow a line parallel and as close to the barrage as possible. “At hour H the barrage will move forward to the north at a rate of 50 meters per minute until it reaches the wire entanglement and subsequently at the rate of 30 meters per minute. By order of Tupes.”[166]

 

Phase one of the attack plan broke down when the 120^th failed to take the heights. No rocket was fired and the 372^nd received no signal to begin the attack. A decision was made to launch the assault anyway at 1:50 PM. In an attempt to carrying out the rest of the orders, the 372^nd followed a rolling barrage toward Monthois. They are able to drive the advance to a point about ¾ of a mile south of the town. The Germans unleashed heavy machine gun fire from the front and enfilading fire from the heights southwest of town where the 120^th had taken only part of the ridge. One soldier in the 372^nd commented that they were now facing the “Prussian Guards” and were up against real fighters. Colonel Tupes sent a runner to his beleaguered 2^nd Battalion, “Am sending you 8 additional officers for duty with you. Have your men dig in. Hold your ground at all costs.”[167] So close to their objective, they dug in and struggled to hold their position.[168]

 

The German Third Army noted that after 10:00 AM enemy fire had increased from Sommepy to Challerange and continued to increase, “…until it reached a point of great intensity.” They counterattacked and were able to repulse several enemy attacks that had been preceded by violent artillery preparation. However, in some places the enemy did succeed in gaining a foothold in the main line of resistance.[169]

 

At 3:00 AM on October 3 orders were again sent for an advance along the front. At 6:45 AM the 120^th Moroccan attacked and again failed to take their objective. The 372^nd continued to hold its ground. Then at 11:50 AM a combined attack was made by the 120^th, the 157^th, and 161^st in line left to right. Some progress was made. The 161^st captured Challerange and the 157^th had a new forward position, but once more the 120^th had been stopped. The difference this day being that Monthois was now partially surrounded and the allies controlled most of the ground south of town. However, the railway yard and supply depot north of the town remained in German hands. The town of Monthois lie between the belligerents and was subjected to such heavy shelling from both armies, neither side could occupy it. Captain W.F. Smith of 2^nd Battalion sent Tupes a message making an excuse for not reporting their strength, “It is impossible to get names of the men without causing machine gun fire on the entire line and under artillery fire continuously, will send the list as soon as possible.” A soldier of the 372^nd said, “Our losses have been rather heavy during the past 24 hours, but we have inflicted a much heavier loss on the enemy.” As the attack sputtered out the advance was suspended for the day.[170]

 

Marshall Foch was not pleased with the progress being made by the Americans or the French. With the U.S. troops stalled, he threatened to break up General Pershing’s army. Pershing saved his command by promising to resume the offensive. His Army renewed their attacks on October 4.[171] Foch also told Pétain that Gouraud’s forces had performed poorly. Foch seemed to agree with Ludendorff’s assessment, “The (German) defensive battle in Champagne and on the Meuse. On either side of the Argonne had followed a favorable course.”[172]

 

Before daylight on October 4^th, the American First Army opened an hour and a half preparatory artillery barrage and then attacked at 5:30 AM. The surprise enjoyed by the Americans when the campaign opened in September was gone. During the lull since September 29 the Germans had moved 10 to 16 divisions, including some of their best divisions, to the Franco-American front. The Americans made little progress. One benefit was the German Armies could no longer offer mutual support.[173]

 

Along the 372^nd’s front, dawn came at about 6:54. Visibility was obscured by heavy fog and the Germans took full advantage. Supported by artillery they made a determined counterattack. Two battalions of the French 333rd and the 372nd, 2nd Battalion met them. Tupes entire line held. The attack was completely beaten back and no Allied prisoners were taken. The Germans lost fifty-five prisoners and six machine guns.[174] As the fog burned off, the Germans could be seen in the distance destroying supplies and moving wounded. Trains were also seen moving out of Monthois. French artillery continued to bombard roads and railroads north of the town.[175] Allied bombers added to the destruction. Strong bomber squadrons hit roads and supply depots. German Third Army reported they had shot down eight enemy planes.[176]

 

The 372^nd continued to hold its position against constant counter attacks. The planned October 5 attack on Monthois was postponed. The 120^th still had not captured the ridge.[177] On this day the first German note was sent to President Wilson.[178] The next day the 157^th attacked the German line at Monthois again. The Germans responded with heavy artillery fire. This time, the Germans were being pushed back. The liaison work of the 157^th was outstanding. Not a single gap had been left open. Early in the morning, patrols from the 372^nd enter Monthois. Enemy machine guns drove them back out of the town. The patrols returned, supported by a gun and its crew.[179] Later that afternoon they got the final break they needed and rushed into the decimated town. Dead tired, hungry, and in general, used up, the 372^nd had finally reached their objective.[180] During the night of October 6-7 the French 125th Division relieved the infantry and engineers of the 157th “Red Hand” Division.[181]

 

The first phase of Foch’s plan had finally been completed. It had taken the Allies considerably longer than originally expected to reach their objectives. The Germans would complete their Gudrun Movement to the Hermann-Hunding-Brunhild Position, as planned. In the weeks to come that line would collapse too. The armistice-peace plan failed and Ludendorff resigned his position on October 26, 1918.[182] The fighting would rage on until November 11, when the war ended. Foch’s plan to push the Germans out of France and be in a position to win the war in the spring of 1919 had exceeded his expectations.

Most African Americans who went into World War I did so to fight for democracy and defend their country.[183] They accomplished what President Wilson had asked of them. The U.S. Army chose to overlook the combat efficiency, the loyalty, and supreme sacrifice of these fine combat regiments. The African Americans who answered their country’s call were undeterred by being transferred to the French Army and distinguished themselves on the battlefield. The French awarded regimental Croix de Guerre (Cross of War) honors to the 369^th, 371^st and 372^nd regiments.[184] Numerous soldiers from these regiments, as well as the 368^th, received the same individual French honor. The 369^th will forever be known as the “Harlem Hell Fighters” and is remembered in several books. On December 15, 1918, French General Goybet issued General Order No. 265, paying special tribute to their “gallant comrades” of the 371^st and 372^nd Regiments saying, “Our Pure Brotherhood in Arms has been consecrated in the Blood of the Brave.”[185] Yet, it was to be the arguably lack luster performance of the 368^th Regiment that defined U.S. military thinking regarding the use of African American soldiers in the years between the end of World War I and the Korean War. Destined to be treated by the U.S., as second-class soldiers; unfit for combat until after World War II, the French already understood and appreciated their value as brave fighting men. For all of the French military accolades bestowed on them, the most poignant may be in a letter penned by a French woman and published in a French newspaper. Living in a town where African Americans had been billeted she said: “But what a surprise ­− they are black soldiers!…one could not find a soldier more faultless in his bearing, and in his manners more affable or more delicate than these Children of the Sun…Soldier Friends, our hearts, our wishes go with you. May the bullets of the enemy spare you. May destiny be merciful to you. And if any of you should never see your native home again, may the soil of France give you sweet repose.”[186]

 

 

 

 

Citation Abbreviations

 

ABMC – American Battle Monuments Commission

 

NA – National Archives

 

USWWI – The United States Army in World War I [computer file]. Version 2.0,1.

 

USAWC – U.S. Army War College

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

 

Primary Sources

 

DuBois, W. E. Burghardt, ed., “Documents of the War,” The Crisis, May, 1919, 16-21. http://library.brown.edu/pdfs/1295987016703125.pdf. (accessed December 4, 2013).

 

Edmonds, James E., Brigadier-General Sir, History of the Great War: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, May-July: The German Diversion and the First Allied Counter Offensive, Nashville, The Battery Press, 1994.

 

Foch, Ferdinand, translated Colonel T. Bentley Mott, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch. Garden City, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Incorporated, 1931.

 

Guttman, Jon, “Regiment’s Pride: Interview with Captain Hamilton Fish.” Military History (October, 1991) 35-41.

 

Harbord, James G., The American Army in France 1917 – 1919. Boston, Little Brown, and Company, 1936.

 

Little, Arthur W. From Harlem to the Rhine: The Story of New York’s Colored Volunteers, New York, Covici, Friede Publishers, 1936.

 

Ludendorff, Erich Von, Ludendorff’s Own Story: August 1914 – November 1918. New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1919.

 

Ludendorff, Erich Von, and General John Pershing, “Storming the Argonne: America’s Biggest Battle, September 26^th-October 16^th.” Vol. 6 of Source Records of the Great War, edited by Charles F. Horne, Ph.D. and Walter F. Austin, LLM. Indianapolis: The American Legion, 1931.

 

Mason, Monroe, and Arthur Franklin Furr, The American Negro Soldier with the Red Hand of France. Boston, The Cornhill Company, Kessinger Publishing; Legacy Reprints, 1920.

 

National Archives, 93d Division, RG120 Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919, Headquarters Decimal File – 004.5 to 210.5, Box 5 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241.
National Archives, 93d Division, RG120 Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919, Headquarters Decimal File –322.03 to 455, Box 7 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241.
National Archives, RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919 92^rd Division, Historic Decimal File – 367^th Inf Reg 12.8 to 368th Inf Reg -32.8 Box 10 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241.
National Archives, RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919 92^rd Division, Historic Decimal File – 368^th Inf Reg 33.6 to 351st Machine Gun Battalion 11.4 -32.8 Box 11 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241
National Archives, RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919 93^rd Division, Historic Decimal File – 10.5 to Historic Decimal File 370th Inf Reg -50.4 Box 1 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241.
National Archives, 93^rd Division Records of the American Expidtionary Forces (WWI) RG120 Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919, Historical Decimal File- 371^st Inf Regt –10.7 to 371^st Inf Regt -32.8 , Box 2 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241.
National Archives, RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919 93^rd Division, Historic Decimal File – 371^st Inf Regt – 32.9 to 372^nd Inf Reg -33.8, Box 3 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241

 

Report of Battles and Other Affairs of the 371^st Infantry in France, 1918. Battles., RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919, 93^rd Division, Box 2 ARC ID 301641 Entry NM-91 1241, National Archives, College Park.

 

Ross, Warner A., My Colored Battalion, Chicago, Warner A. Ross, Publisher, 1920, Nabu Public Domain Reprints.

 

Scott, Emmett J., Scott’s Official History of the American Negro in the World War. Lexington, Reprints from the Collection of the University of Michigan Library, 2013.

 

Shaw, Charles A. Lt., trans. French newspaper article by a French Woman, “The Colored Americans in France,” The Crisis, February, 1919, 167-168, http://library.brown.edu. (accessed December 4, 2013).

 

Spencer, Tracy Lovette and James E. Spencer, Jr., “World War I as I Saw It: The Memoir of an African American Soldier.” Massachusetts Historical Review Vol. 9 (2007): 134-165, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25081215 (accessed Aug. 31, 2012).

 

Tupes, Herschel Colonel, Report of 372d U.S. Infantry, RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919, 93^rd Division, Box 3 ARC ID 301641 Entry NM-91 1241, National Archives, College Park.

 

U.S. Army, War College. World War I: Veteran Survey Collection; 92^nd Division: 183^rd Infantry Brigade, 184^th Infantry Brigade, 93^rd Division: 185^th Infantry Brigade, 186^th Infantry Brigade, The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle.

 

The United States Army in World War I [computer file]. Version 2.0, 1. United States Army – History – World War, 1914 – 1918, CD-ROM., United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919. Vols. 1-17. United States Army Center of Military History, CHM EM 0023.

 

U.S. Congress. House. Erection of a Monument in France to Commemorate the Valient Services of the Ninety-Third Division of the American Expeditionary Forces. Hearings, 69^th Congress, 1^st session, March 1926. 40p. #05-93.1926.

 

 

Period Photos

 

National Archives, RG 111-SC Prints: Military History, 1860-1938, 11858 to 11975, Box 83.

 

National Archives, RG 111-SC Prints: Military History, 1860-1938, 25861 to25965, Box 175

 

National Archives, RG 111-SC Prints: Military History, 1860-1938, 35544 to 35648, Box 265

 

National Archives, RG 111-SC Prints: Military History, 1860-1938, 36613 to 36717, Box 275

 

National Archives, RG 111-SC Prints: Military History, 1860-1938, 39457 to 39561, Box 301

 

National Archives, RG 111-SC Prints: Military History, 1860-1938, 43972 to 44079, Box 341

 

 

Secondary Sources

 

American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe. Washington D.C., Center of Military History United States Army, 1995

 

American Battle Monuments Commission, 92d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944. http://www.history.army.mil/afam/92div.htm. (accessed September 23, 2013).

 

American Battle Monuments Commission, 93d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944. . http://www.history.army.mil/afam/93div.htm. (accessed September 23, 2013).

 

Barbeau, Arthur E.,and Florette Henri, The Unknown Soldiers: African-American Troops in World War I. San Bernardino, CA: Da Capo Press Edition, 1996.

 

Bruce, Robert B., A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

 

Bryan, Jami, “Fighting for Respect: African-American Soldiers in WWI,” On-Point (2003). http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwi/articles/fightingforrespect.aspx (accessed October 3, 2013).

 

Cochrane, Rexmond C., Use of Gas in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign: September – November 1918. Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Office of the Chief Chemical Officer Army Chemical Center, Maryland, 1958.

 

Doughty, Robert A., Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War, Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.

 

Ferrell, Robert H., Unjustly Dishonored: an African American Division in World War I. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 2011.

 

Hamburger, Kenneth E., Learning Lessons in the American Expeditionary Forces, Carlisle, United States Army Center of Military History, CMH Pub 24-1.

 

Harris, Stephen L., Harlem’s Hell Fighters: African-American 369^th Infantry in World War I. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2003.

 

Keegan, John, The First World War, New York, Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc, 2000.

 

U.S. Army, War College. Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War. 3 Vols., Vol. 2, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931-1949, Facsimile Reprint, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington D.C., 1988.

 

 

Journal Articles and Papers

 

Johnson, Charles Jr., “Military Service in World War I.” In African American Soldiers in the National Guard: Recruitment and Deployment During Peacetime and War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992. The African American Experience. Greenwood Publishing Group. http://testaae.greenwood.com/doc.aspx?fileID=JBS-546&path=books/greenwood. (accessed July 224, 2013).

 

Keene, Jennifer D., The Memory of the Great War in the African American Community, in Unknown Soldiers. http://www.chapman.edu/our-faculty/files/publications/keene-jennifer/Memory%20of%20War%20in%20the%20African%20American%20Community.pdf

 

Pratt, Don F., “Critical Analysis of the: French Champagne Offensive from 26 September to 11 November 1918,” Individual Research Paper, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, 1932. http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll14/id/584. (accessed September 3, 2013).

 

United States Army Center of Military History, The U.S. Army in World War I, 1917-1918, http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/PDF/Chapter01.pdf, (accessed, September 24, 2013).

 

World-timedate.com, Sunrise Sunset Time of Paris-France-Europe (September & October, 1918), , http://www.world-timedate.com/astronomy/sunrise_sunset/sunrise_sunset_time.php?month=9&year=1918&sun_param=0&city_id=206 (accessed June 5, 2014).

 

 

Maps

 

ABMC, German Defensive Positions Behind Western Front September 1918, American Armies, 169

 

ABMC, American Battle Operations in the Champagne Region, American Armies, (copy provided is an enlarged view of the portion of the map discussed in the text.) 379.

 

ABMC, 93D Division (369^th, 371^st and 372D Infantry Regiments) Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) Offensive September 26-October 8, 1918, 93^rd Division, (In the on-line version used for reference the Contents lists Operation Maps [omitted]. The hard copy at the USAWC contains the maps. The map provided is a photocopy of that map).

 

USWWI, Plan of Attack of First Army Meuse-Argonne Operation 26 September 1918, Vol 9, 128.

 

USWWI, Combined Order of Battle Meuse-Argonne Operation 26 September 1918 (a.m.), Vol. 9, 133.

 

USWWI, Franco-American Operations Champagne Meuse-Argonne Woevre 12 September-11 November 1918, Vol. 9, 467.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Most African Americans who went into World War I did so to fight for democracy and defend their country.[187] They accomplished what President Wilson had asked of them. The U.S. Army chose to overlook the combat efficiency, the loyalty, and supreme sacrifice of these fine combat regiments. The African Americans who answered their country’s call were undeterred by being transferred to the French Army and distinguished themselves on the battlefield. The French awarded regimental Croix de Guerre (Cross of War) honors to the 369^th, 371^st and 372^nd regiments.[188] Numerous soldiers from these regiments, as well as the 368^th, received the same individual French honor. The 369^th will forever be known as the “Harlem Hell Fighters” and is remembered in several books. On December 15, 1918, French General Goybet issued General Order No. 265, paying special tribute to their “gallant comrades” of the 371^st and 372^nd Regiments saying, “Our Pure Brotherhood in Arms has been consecrated in the Blood of the Brave.”[189] Yet, it was to be the arguably lack luster performance of the 368^th Regiment that defined U.S. military thinking regarding the use of African American soldiers in the years between the end of World War I and the Korean War. Destined to be treated as second-class soldiers by the U.S. Army; unfit for combat until after World War II, the French already understood and appreciated their value as brave fighting men. For all of the French military accolades bestowed on them, the most poignant may be in a letter penned by a French woman and published in a French newspaper. Living in a town where African Americans had been billeted she said: “But what a surprise­−they are black soldiers!…one could not find a soldier more faultless in his bearing, and in his manners more affable or more delicate than these Children of the Sun…Soldier Friends, our hearts, our wishes go with you. May the bullets of the enemy spare you. May destiny be merciful to you. And if any of you should never see your native home again, may the soil of France give you sweet repose.”

 

The African American troops fought gallantly with the French and were richly rewarded with French citations and French medals of Honor. The 369^th will forever be known as the “Harlem Hell Fighters” and remembered in several books. On December 15, 1918, General Goybet issued General Order No. 265, paying special tribute to their “gallant comrades” of the 371^st and 372^nd Regiments saying, “Our Pure Brotherhood in Arms has been consecrated in the Blood of the Brave.”[190] The much-maligned 368^th paid a heavy price in lives for a tainted reputation. The most poignant tribute of all may be the one published in a French newspaper article. Written by a French woman, who lived in a town where several African American troops were billeted, said, “Soldier friends, our hearts, our wishes, go with you…Soldiers, who arrived among us one clear June day, redolent with the scent of roses, you will always live in our hearts.”[191]

 

 

[1] The United States Army in World War I [computer file]. Version 2.0, 1. United States Army – History – World War, 1914 – 1918, CD-ROM., United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919. Vol. 9. (United States Army Center of Military History, CHM EM 0023.): 514, Monroe Mason and Arthur Franklin Furr, The American Negro Soldier with the Red Hand of France. (Boston, The Cornhill Company, Kessinger Publishing; Legacy Reprints, 1920.): 117.

[2] Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 119.

[3] Ferdinand Foch, trans. Colonel T. Bentley Mott, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch. (Garden City, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Incorporated, 1931.): 404, 405, 406, Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.): 223n12, U.S. Army Campaigns: from “The Army Flag and Its Streamers,” Streamers: Double rainbow, World War I, (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Campaign Summitries last updated 19 November 2010). http://www.history.army.mil/html/reference/army_flag/wwi.html. (accessed 28 August 2013): 4.

[4]Bruce, A Fraternity, 229.

[5] Emmett J. Scott, Scott’s Official History of the American Negro in the World War. (Lexington, Reprints from the Collection of the University of Michigan Library, 2013.): 208.

[6] 13-215, 19-1 Stephen L. Harris, Harlem’s Hell Fighters: African-American 369^th Infantry in World War I. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2003.): 215, Don F. Pratt, “Critical Analysis of the: French Champagne Offensive from 26 September to 11 November 1918,” Individual Research Paper, (Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, 1932.) http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll14/id/584. (accessed September 3, 2013.): 1.

[7] Jon Guttman, “Regiment’s Pride: Interview with Captain Hamilton Fish.” Military History (October, 1991) 35-41.: 40.

[8] James E. Edmonds, Brigadier-General Sir, ed., History of the Great War: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, May-July: The German Diversion and the First Allied Counter Offensive, (Nashville, The Battery Press, 1994.): 305, n1.

[9] Erich Von Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story: August 1914 – November 1918. Vol. 2 (New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1919.): 349-350, Pratt, Critical Analysis: 1

[10] Foch, Memoirs, 403, James G. Harbord, The American Army in France 1917 – 1919. (Boston, Little Brown, and Company, 1936.): 433, American Battle Monuments Commission, 92d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington D.C.: (Government Printing Office, 1944. http://www.history.army.mil/afam/92div.htm.), (accessed September 23, 2013.): 7, John Keegan, The First World War, (New York, Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc, 2000.): 180, Pratt, Critical Analysis: 4.

[11] USAWWI, Vol. 3, 670, Vol. 9, 509, 511.

[12] Foch, Memoirs, 404.

[13] Charles Johnson Jr, “Military Service in World War I.” In African American Soldiers in the National Guard: Recruitment and Deployment During Peacetime and War, The African American Experience, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992.. Greenwood Publishing Group. http://testaae.greenwood.com/doc.aspx?fileID=JBS-546&path=books/greenwood.), (accessed July 224, 2013.): 4.

[14] USAWWI, Vol.3, 262, 263, 266, 271.

[15] Ibid, 271.

[16] Foch, Memoirs, 409, Ludendorff, Erich Von, and General John Pershing, ed. Charles F. Horne, Ph.D. and Walter F. Austin, LLM “Storming the Argonne: America’s Biggest Battle, September 26^th-October 16^th.” in Source Records of the Great War, Vol. 6. (Indianapolis: The American Legion, 1931.): 346

[17] ABMC, 92d Division: 6, 7, American Battle Monuments Commission, 93d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington D.C.: (Government Printing Office, 1944. http://www.history.army.mil/afam/93div.htm.), (accessed September 23, 2013).: 8.

[18] Foch, Memoirs, 409, ABMC, 92d Division, 7.

[19] Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War, (Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.): 482.

[20] Harbord, The American Army, 450, ABMC, 92d Division, 7, USAWWI, Vol 9, 86.

[21] ABMC, 93d Division, 8.

[22] Bruce, A Fraternity, 265.

[23] Harbord, The American Army, 430, U.S. Army, War College. Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War. 3 Vols., Vol. 2, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931-1949, Facsimile Reprint, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington D.C., 1988.): 111.

[24] Harbord, The American Army, 429,

[25] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 507

[26] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 99, 509.

[27] ABMC, 93d Division, 1.

[28] Ibid, 5-6, Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 18.

[29] National Archives, Report of Battles and Other Affairs of the 371^st Infantry in France, 1918. Battles., RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919, 93^rd Division, Box 2 ARC ID 301641 Entry NM-91 1241, (National Archives, College Park.): 1, Scott, Scott’s Official History, 207, Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 16.

[30] ABMC, 93d Division, 5.

[31] Ibid, 26.

[32] Tracy Lovette Spencer, and James E. Spencer, Jr., “World War I as I Saw It: The Memoir of an African American Soldier.” Massachusetts Historical Review (Vol. 9 (2007): 134-165, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25081215 (accessed Aug. 31, 2012): 157, Herschel Tupes, Colonel, Report of 372d U.S. Infantry, RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919, 93^rd Division, Box 3 ARC ID 301641 Entry NM-91 1241, (National Archives, College Park.): 25 (3.6).

[33] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 504.

[34] ABMC, 93d Division, 11.

[35] Ibid, 12.

[36] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 498.

[37] ABMC, 92d Division, 8, USAWWI, Vol. 9,119.

[38] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 513.

[39] Stephen L. Harris, Harlem’s Hell Fighters: African-American 369^th Infantry in World War I. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2003.): 241.

[40] Spencer, WWI as I Saw It, 158.

[41] Rexmond C. Cochrane, Use of Gas in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign: September – November 1918. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office, Office of the Chief Chemical Officer Army Chemical Center, Maryland, 1958.): 14.

[42] Cochrane, Use of Gas, 16, 18.

[43] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 514.

[44] USAWC, Order of Battle, 117, n20.

[45] Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 119

[46] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 514

[47] Ibid, 126, Ludendorff, Storming the Argonne, 356.

[48] Cochrane, Use of Gas, 75, 76, 78.

[49] Kenneth E. Hamburger, Learning Lessons in the American Expeditionary Forces, (Carlisle, United States Army Center of Military History, CMH Pub 24-1.): 14, 16, United States Army Center of Military History, The U.S. Army in World War I, 1917-1918, http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/PDF/Chapter01.pdf, (accessed, September 24, 2013): 13.

[50] Bruce, A Fraternity, 271, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 518.

[51] World-timedate.com, Sunrise Sunset Time of Paris-France-Europe (September, 1918), viewed on-line June 5, 2014, http://www.world-timedate.com/astronomy/sunrise_sunset/sunrise_sunset_time.php?month=9&year=1918&sun_param=0&city_id=206, Pratt, Critical Analysis, 5, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 170.

[52] Ibid, 138, 143, 161.

[53] ABMC, 92d Division, 12.

[54] Ibid, 12.

[55] American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and Battlefields in Europe. (Washington D.C., Center of Military History United States Army, 1995): 367, Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown Soldiers: African-American Troops in World War I.(San Bernardino, CA: Da Capo Press Edition, 1996.): 151, ABMC, 92d Division, 13.

[56] ABMC, 92d Division, 13, 14.

[57] ABMC, 93d Division, 11, USAWC, Order of Battle, 439.

[58] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 513.

[59] ABMC, 93d Division, 9, 11, ABMC, American Armies, 336, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 486.

[60] Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 118.

[61] Ibid, 118, ABMC, American Armies, 358, USAWC, Order of Battle, 439.

[62] USAWC, Order of Battle, 439, ABMC, 93d Division, 12.

[63] ABMC, 93d Division, 12.

[64] Tupes, Report, 7, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 506, NA, Report of Battles, 1, Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 120.

[65] Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 119, 120.

[66] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 175.

[67] USAWC, Order of Battle, 121, Foch, Memoirs, 412.

[68] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 169, 516.

[69] Ibid, 169, 172.

[70] ABMC, 92d Division, 15.

[71] Ibid, 16, Barbeau, Unknown Soldiers, 15.

[72] Harris, Harlem’s Hell Fighters, 245-247, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 166.

[73] ABMC, 93d Division, 13, ABMC, American Armies, 336, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 336.

[74] ABMC, 93d Division, 13.

[75] Harris, Harlem’s Hell Fighters, 250, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 250, ABMC, 93d Division, 14.

[76] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 517, Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 122.

[77] NA, Report of Battles, 1, ABMC, 93d Division, 14.

[78] Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 121, Tupes, Report, 7, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 169, 172, 506.

[79] USAWWI War, Vol. 9, 141, 166, Ludendorff, Own Story, 373, Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 122.

[80] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 516, 518.

[81] ABMC, 92d Division, 7.

[82] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 144.

[83] ABMC, 92d Division, 17.

[84] ABMC, 93d Division, 15.

[85] ABMC, American Armies, 339, ABMC, 92d Division, 17.

[86] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 177, 180.

[87] ABMC, 92d Division, 18.

[88] Ibid, 18

[89] Ibid, 19

[90] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 489, ABMC, 93d Division, 14.

[91] ABMC, 93d Division, 15.

[92] Idib, 16, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 491, 493.

[93] Harris, Harlem’s Hell Fighters, 251, Arthur W. Little, From Harlem to the Rhine: The Story of New York’s Colored Volunteers, (New York, Covici, Friede Publishers, 1936.): 275.

[94] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 492.

[95] Ibid, 489, 502, ABMC, 93d Division, 9, 15, 16, NA, Report of Battles, 1.

[96] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 502, NA, Report of Battles, 1.

[97] NA, RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919 93^rd Division, Historic Decimal File – 371^st Inf. Regt – 10.7 to 371^st Inf. Regt -32.8, Box 2 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241.

[98] ibid

[99] USAWC, Order of Battle, 440.

[100] ABMC, 93d Division, 17, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 502.

[101] ABMC, 93d Division, 16, Tupes, Report, 7.

[102] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 500.

[103]NA, Field Messages, Reports, RG 120 Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), Records of Combat Divisions 1918-1919 93^rd Division, Historic Decimal File – 371^st Inf Regt – 32.9 to 372^nd Inf Reg -33.8, Box 3 ARC ID 301641, Entry NM-91 1241, ABMC, 93d Division, 16.

[104] ABMC, 93d Division, 13, Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 122.

[105] NA, Field Messages-Reports, Box 3.

[106] Ibid

[107] Tupes, Report, 6, 7, ABMC, American Armies, 358.

[108] Mason, The American Negro Soldier, 122, U.S. Army in WWI, U.S. Army in the World War, Vol. 9, 506.

[109] ABMC, American Armies, 336.

[110] ABMC, 93d Division, 14.

[111] NA, Field Messages-Reports, Box 3.

[112] Ibid, ABMC, 93d Division, 17, ABMC, American Armies, 358.

[113] ABMC, 93d Division, 17, ABMC, American Armies, 358.

[114] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 521.

[115] Ludendorff, Own Story, 373, U.S. Army Campaigns, The Army Flag, 5.

[116] Ludendorff, Own Story, 376.

[117] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 180, 185..

[118] Ibid, 148, 183, Ludendorff, Storming the Argonne, 356, Harbord, The American Army, 436, 441.

[119] Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, 493.

[120] ABMC, 92d Division, 19.

[121] ABMC, 92d Division, 21, 22.

[122] Ibid, 9, 21

[123] ABMC, 93d Division, 17, 19.

[124] ABMC, American Armies, 358, ABMC, 93d Division, 17, Harris, Harlem’s Hell Fighters, 252.

[125] USAWC, Order of Battle, 440, ABMC, American Armies, 336, 358, 359, Harris, Harlem’s Hell Fighters, 252.

[126] Little, From Harlem, 286, 287.

[127] Harris, Harlem’s Hell Fighters, 255, ABMC, 93d Division, 17, 18.

[128]ABMC, 93d Division, 18.

[129] NA, Report of Battles, 1, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 502, ABMC, American Armies, 336, 359.

[130] Barbeau, Unknown Soldiers, 134.

[131] Tupes, Report, 7, ABMC, 93d Division, 18, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 506.

[132] Tupes, Report, 7, ABMC, 93d Division, 18, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 506.

[133] Ludendorff, Own Story, 377, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 523.

[134] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 522, 24.

[135] Bruce, A Fraternity, 269, Ludendorff, Storming the Argonne, 356, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 180.

[136] ABMC, 93d Division, 20.

[137] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 185.

[138] ABMC, 92d Division, 22.

[139] ABMC, American Armies, 339, 366, ABMC, 92d Division, 9, 22.

[140] ABMC, 92d Division, 24.

[141] USAWC, Order of Battle, 433, ABMC, 92d Division, 22.

[142] ABMC, 93d Division, 10, 20, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 494, 495, USAWC, Order of Battle, 440.

[143] Guttman, Regiment’s Pride, 40.

[144] Ibid.

[145] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 494, 502, ABMC, 93d Division, 21.

[146] NA, Field Messages–Reports,Box 2 (underlining included in the original message, ABMC, 93d Division, 21, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 502, ABMC, American Armies, 360.

[147] NA, Field Messages–Reports, Box 2.

[148] Spencer, WWI as I Saw It, 160, Tupes, Report, 7.

[149] Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, 491, Harbord, The American Army, 449, Ludendorff, Own Story, 378, 380, 381, 387, Pratt, Critical Analysis, 3.

[150] Pratt, Critical Analysis, 2, ABMC, American Armies, 353.

[151] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 526.

[152] Ibid, 527.

[153] Bruce, A Fraternity, 270, Harbord, The American Army, 442, 444.

[154] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 207.

[155] Scott, Scott’s Official History, 241, Harbord, The American Army, 444, USAWWI, 205.

[156] ABMC, American Armies, 339, ABMC, 92d Division, 9, 24.

[157] ABMC, American Armies, 336, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 504, ABMC, 93d Division, 21, NA, Report of Battles, 1, USAWC, Order of Battle, 440.

[158] NA, Field Messages–Reports, Box 2

[159] Tupes, Report, 7.

[160] ABMC, 93d Division, 21.

[161] Scott, Scott’s Official History, 242, Tupes, Report, 7.

[162] NA, Field Messages-Reports, Box 3

[163] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 529, 530.

[164] ABMC, 93d Division, 21-22.

[165] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 197.

[166] Ibid, 500,1&2.

[167] National Achieves, messages NA, Field Messages-Reports, Box 3

[168] ABMC, American Armies, 336, 360, ABMC, 93d Division, 22, USAWC, Order of Battle, 440, Spencer, WWI as I Saw It, 160.

[169]USAWWI, Vol. 9, 532.

[170] ABMC, 93d Division, 22, Tupes, Report, 7, Scott, Scott’s Official History, 242, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 506.

[171] Cochrane, Use of Gas, 73, Ludendorff, Storming the Argonne, 356-357.

[172] Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, 490, Ludendorff, Own Story, 402.

[173] Ludendorff, Storming the Argonne, 531, USAWWI, Vol. 9, 535, 536.

[174] Tupes, Report, 7, U.S. USAWWI, 506.

[175] Scott, Scott’s Official History, 242.

[176] USAWWI, Vol. 9, 537.

[177] ABMC, 93d Division, 23.

[178] Ludendorff, Own Story, 386.

[179] Scott, Scott’s Official History, 242.

[180] Spencer, WWI as I Saw It, 161.

[181] Tupes, Report, 7.

[182] Ludendorff, Own Story, 426.

[183] U.S. Army, War College. World War I: Veteran Survey Collection; 92^nd Division: 183^rd Infantry Brigade, 184^th Infantry Brigade, 93^rd Division: 185^th Infantry Brigade, 186^th Infantry Brigade, (Carlisle, The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center).

 

[184] Scott, Scott’s Official History, 259.

[185] NA, Box 3

[186] Charles A. Shaw, Lt, trans., The Colored Americans in France, from an article appearing in a French newspaper where the Ninety-second Div was temp quartered, Author was a French woman, The Crisis, (Feb, 1919 Vol 17, No 4.): 167-168.

[187] War College, Vet survey.

[188] Scott, Official History, 259.

[189] NA, Box 3

[190] NA, Box 3

[191] Charles A. Shaw, Lt, trans., The Colored Americans in France, from an article appearing in a French newspaper where the Ninety-second Div was temp quartered, Author was a French woman, The Crisis, (Feb, 1919 Vol 17, No 4.): 167-168.